

Globalization from a Canadian Perspective

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In speaking about globalization from a Canadian perspective, it is to be admitted that globalization encompasses a very large number of variables and that much disagreement exists about the order which should exist among these variables (the order which *normatively exists* among these different variables). Determining the configuration of any given order determines the value or the weight which exists with respect to the influence of any given variable. How does this variable relate to this other variable? What kind of impact does it have and what is the degree of impact? If we want to speak about globalization in a way which abstracts from the particular experience of any given country, we could possibly move toward some kind of general theory: a general determination of terms and relations which would exist as a point of departure for any particular analysis that we would apply if we would want to look at how a given country is being changed (for better or for worse in this way or in that way) as a consequence of globalizing influences that have been reducing the significance of national states as these have existed for us in our recent human history. If, in the history of western Europe, the rise of national monarchies can be dated from the late 13th Century, and if, within this same history, nationalism in Europe can be viewed as a late 18th Century development (a consequence of the French revolution of 1789), we should soon realize that other forms of human organization can be brought into being within our current human world. Change this condition or that condition and a better or a worse form of human order could possibly present itself to us (a form of order which some persons would support and for which they would be willing to devote their time and energy). By changing different kinds of conditions, we can construct new orders or new patterns of human living. New technologies, new economies, new polities, new cultures, and new human friendships can arise to join persons with each other (the bonds which exist between persons generating new forms of community life).

Canadian Conditions

To begin, however, with the Canadian side of the equation, some remarks need to be made about the uniqueness of Canada as a nation state. If this uniqueness is not understood, we will be handicapped in moving toward an understanding which would want to speak about how globalization can be viewed from the point of view of a Canadian perspective.

First, as a nation state, Canada exists largely as a consequence of British government policy and less as a consequence of decisions which were made by Canadians, living and working amongst themselves. If it can be said about India that its political unity was imposed upon it by British colonial policy, the same can be said about Canada's political unity (even if we admit that Canada's political unity has survived since its inception in 1867 while India's political unity ceased to exist after 1947). As a cost cutting measure, in 1866, the British government decided to withdraw its military forces from the Canadian interior, thus exposing Canada's hinterland to possible attacks and invasions that could come from the United States. The Canadians were told that, to some extent, they must begin to care for themselves. When the colony of New Brunswick elected a government which rejected Canadian federation, its British appointed governor (Lord Gordon) provoked a crisis which allowed him to dismiss the newly elected local government and then appoint a new government which favored the Canadian federation. Hence, when we think about Canada as a nation state, we must think about a state that is not lacking in fragility. We refer to absences of internal cohesion and homogeneity. In Canada no universal agreement exists about the identity of defining moments in Canada's history (defining moments which, as catalysts, create or form a distinct Canadian national identity). Two official

languages are recognized in Canada (French and English) and, in recent years, Canada's native people have been granted a distinct constitutional status. The national federal government seems to be declining in importance, relative to the growing power of local governments (whether we speak here about provinces, territories, or the administration of large cities). If, today, newly emerging supranational organizations of one kind or another are threatening the autonomy and the independence of individual nation states, it should be said about Canada that the fragility of the Canadian nation state is a source of unease for many Canadians. Canadians know that Canada owes its being and existence to the workings of an imperial power which, in its day, had exercised a world wide global influence, creating conditions that have hastened the pace of globalization, facilitating the later globalization of our human community. If we come from different parts of the world and if we try to speak with each other, we tend to use English as our common means of communication.

Second, Canadian geographical conditions explain why Canada has only one neighbor and this neighbor is greatly feared. I refer, of course, to the United States. If we look at a map of the world and at the borders of the different countries which exist in our world, we see that most countries usually have more than one neighbor. Countries with a huge land mass tend to border on many countries. We look, for instance, at the Russian land mass and the Chinese land mass and we see that these countries have many neighbors (persons and peoples who speak other languages and who have different cultures and histories). But, while Canada is the second largest country in the world, it has only one neighbor: the United States. And, this neighbor has a much larger population (10 Americans for every Canadian). The United States exists as a great economic power and it exercises a cultural influence which dominates the rest of the world (to such an extent that its influence is feared by many). The US and Canada work closely with each other in very many ways. We might ask: where is there a lack of cooperation? Each is the other's best trade partner. In terms of communication, if, for instance, I want to telephone somebody in Canada from somewhere in the US, I use the same dialing code for reaching someone in Canada as I would for reaching someone who lives in another part of the United States. If we look at the distribution of Canada's population, we find that it straddles and huddles the Canadian-US border. It is almost as easy to travel south into the US as it is to travel west or east within Canada (although, today, we all need passports). Hence, while Canadian economic prosperity is very dependent on American economic prosperity and while, officially, strong friendships exist between the Canadian and American governments, the friendship which exists has been compared to the kind of relation which exists between Finland and Russia. The Finns seek to be on good terms with the Russians because it is absolutely necessary for them to always have good relations with the Russians. The same case applies with Canada. It is necessary for Canada to work closely with the Americans and to be in a condition of friendship with the US. However, because in Canada, a strong anti-American tradition exists (in the US, fortunately, an anti-Canadian tradition does not exist), successive Canadian governments try and limit the extent of American influence in ways which often point to presences of contradiction. As much, for instance, as Canada needs US economic investment to develop her economy, attempts are made to try and control or to limit this investment. The national government has occasionally intervened to prevent the sale of a Canadian corporation to American-owned interests. Successive Canadian governments generously fund cultural activities within Canada in order to reduce the kind of cultural influence which comes from American communications media and the US entertainment industry. The dangers which are presented by American influence explain why Canadians seek to be more closely joined to others persons and people who live in other parts of the world. Canada's eager willingness to participate in other and wider forms of human cooperation with other nations, peoples, and a variety of different organizations is partially explained by a desire to counter American influence (trying to find ways to offset this influence and possibly also challenge this influence if it is seen to be too dangerous). Bilateral relations with other countries are encouraged and,

as a nation state, Canada belongs to 14 international organizations.¹ For many years, Canada resisted joining the Organization of American States since this was seen to exist as an American sphere of influence. Although the OAS was established in 1890, Canada only became a member in 1990.² At the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, Canada refused to fully cooperate with the United States in its attempts to exert pressure on the Cuban and Soviet governments. In contrast with the US, Canada refused to sever diplomatic relations with the government of Fidel Castro. For many years, Cuba has received Canadian foreign aid.

Third, with respect to the being of cultural values and meanings which are used as a context for creating or changing a given social order (differing sets of cultural values suggesting differing forms of human social order), when we think about Canada and Canadians, we find a residual colonial mentality which tends to defer to cultural meanings and interpretations as these come to them from European sources. If changes in meaning occur in Europe, if European governments respond to cultural changes by enacting legislation that reflects an altered set of values about the meaning and purpose of human life (rejecting one set of values in favor of another set of values), Canadians tend to follow suit. Following the Second World War, when different European governments began to enact social legislation to construct comprehensive modern welfare states (giving all citizens adequate economic assistance and full health care benefits from birth to death), the Canadian government in the 1950s and 1960s began to enact laws to construct a comprehensive network of social services which closely resembled European models. A universal health care system was created in Canada in 1966. More recently in Canada and as a prime example of the kind of cultural deference that exists among Canadians for values and beliefs that have been accepted in Europe, in 2005 “Canada became the first country in the Americas and the first country outside Europe to legalize same-sex marriage nationwide.”³ Holland had inaugurated the institution of same sex marriage in 2001 and this was followed by Belgium in 2003 and Spain in 2005. Where, in the US, a tradition of rebellion exists with respect to the normativity of European cultural determinations, a contrary point of view prevails in Canada. In the US, cultural determinations of meaning can emerge in an indigenous manner and Americans are free to believe and to hold that these determinations are normative for themselves in terms of how they would like to live their own lives. No legitimation is needed from sources which exist outside the US. However, in Canada, this brand of self-confidence simply does not exist. If and when, in Canada, individuals are honored for various achievements of one kind or other, this tends to happen only after these persons have been first recognized by other persons and other groups who live and exist in other parts of the world.

Put briefly thus, we can say then about Canada that Canadians do not have a strong distinctive national identity; they live in fear of growing American influence and the dangers of possible American absorption; and they engage in cultural re-evaluations of one kind or another according to agendas which are largely inspired by European points of view. To avoid any kind of over identification with US interests, Canadians attempt to play a kind of mediating role in international relations, trying to find solutions that can lessen the many conflicts which are often a part of international relations. Canadians tend to be strong supporters of the work of the United Nations and its related agencies.

Globalization and the Philosophy of History

These points being made, it is now necessary to turn to the phenomenon of globalization as this exists in our world in so many different ways where, allegedly, we should be able to identify a nature or an

1 <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/globalization> (accessed March 20, 2013).

2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organization_of_American_States (accessed March 20, 2013).

3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-sex_marriage_in_Canada (accessed March 20, 2013)

inner intelligibility that should be peculiar to the phenomena of globalization (identifying what globalization is and indirectly specifying what it is not). However, since the data of globalization is something which extends to the entire human world (encompassing all human variables as these exist in the lives of individuals, groups, and nations), when we refer to globalization in terms which refer to an intensification of interactions which link a larger number of persons and groups with each other, in any understanding which we would have of globalization, we would necessarily seek or turn toward a possible general theory of human activity which we have yet to understand. We refer here to a general theory of human activity which would exist for us as a philosophy of history, albeit, a philosophy of history which would not be satisfied with an understanding which is limited to a species of understanding and knowing which is familiar with past deeds and actions. This record of past deeds and actions should be alluded to since, when we think about it, the past is a legitimate object of historical study. However, by way of an addition or as an amendment, in a philosophy of history which corresponds to accumulations of data which refer to the phenomenon of globalization, we seek to understand every kind of human movement or every kind of human action (every kind of human activity and how distinct specifications of human activity are all related and joined to each other in an intelligible whole). Nothing is to be left out. We look toward a possible general knowledge of human activities which would serve as a point of departure for determining wise decisions about specific possible courses of action that have yet to be known and then put into effect within a given human context.

Put in other words, an adequate understanding of globalization would exist as an understanding of human history which would be equated with the needs and demands of stewardship as this applies to the management or the conduct of our human history, guiding us toward policies and courses of action that would foster a global form of cooperation, leading to the realization of a common human good. Through varying cooperations which, at different levels, would globally unite many persons and groups with each other, we would be creating conditions that would encourage a better living of the human good as this can be done within sets of particular, local circumstances. We all know that, as limited human beings, we best relate to a limited number of other human beings. We cannot be close friends with all persons that we might come to meet and know. It is not uncommon to meet persons who speak about having a general or abstract love of other human beings, these other human beings referring to the sum of humanity. The human race consists of very many human beings. However, since each of us exists within a context that is determined by circumstances (conjugates) of space and time (we are born at a certain time; we live in a certain place; we know this person but we do not know this other person), if we are to love other human beings, this love is most true or it is best expressed if we can attend to the good of persons who are most near or most proximate to ourselves where we happen to be living and working. I refer here to persons who exist as our neighbors. In any form of global cooperation which unites us to persons who are distant in time and space, the value or the goodness of this cooperation can only exist or flourish in a concrete way if it can be expressed in a way which refers to how our living fosters our local community life. Instead of trying to look out upon the greater global world which exists in a way which tries to separate ourselves from our immediate context or which tries to create distance between ourselves and our local conditions, we should try and look out upon the greater world which exists in a way that is rooted in how we live within the context of our concrete circumstances. The greatness of the greater world which exists is best espied (it is best known and it is more fully appreciated for what it is) if it can be seen from within the smallness of our own local contexts: as a backdrop to the foreground which is immediately present to us when we refer to what is present to us within our local conditions and present contexts. It is a truism to speak here about an ongoing form of interaction which always exists between presences of local community and presences of a wider, global community. Each forms and shapes the other. Hence, we employ a neologism which speaks about this relation and the kind of impact which it has: we refer to “glocalization” and processes of

“glocalization.”⁴

The question of stewardship or, more exactly, the growing need for some kind of wise administration of our human affairs is a requirement, however, that is not easily met. I say “requirement” since, in our world today, we tend to admit that, if we cannot be indifferent with respect to the personal decisions which we must make in the conduct of our personal individual lives, we cannot be indifferent to how, as human persons, we live with each other in a way that can possibly turn a group of persons into a community of persons who live and work together in concord and harmony (each helping the other to achieve some kind of higher, greater good), the relations between groups and communities leading to the construction of a complex social order. However, how is this stewardship to be understood? How is it to be conceived? How is it to be implemented? How is it to be structured by us?

Putting these questions in another way, how are contradictions to be avoided in the actualization of different kinds of goods, the existence of different kinds of goods corresponding to the existence of different kinds of actions? One good is intended by a specific action or a specific set of actions and another good is intended by another action or another specific set of actions. However, when contradictions exist between the good that we would like to accomplish through a particular set of actions and another good that we would like to accomplish through another particular set of actions, the result is a mutilation in the production and in the quality of goods: a mutilation, deficiency, or privation which we cannot distinguish from the presence of evil and the experience of suffering which always comes from our encounters with presences of evil.

To cite a glaring example, it is known, for instance, that Canada gives foreign aid to less developed countries. Large sums are spent (relatively speaking). However, it is also known that much of this foreign aid has not been very effective. Canadian government funds are used to purchase goods that are produced by Canadian manufacturers (these purchases add to the wealth of Canadians) and these goods are then shipped to recipient countries. Farm tractors made in Ontario, for example, are shipped to parts of the world that are lacking in the kind of infrastructure which is needed if sophisticated farm equipment is to be maintained on any kind of regular basis. The equipment (when used) soon, eventually, breaks down and instead of a rise in agricultural productivity, the result is a fall in productivity. Bad decisions about technology and economics are made as a consequence of short sighted political decisions and objectives which mix the good and purpose of technological and economic decisions with the purpose and function of political decisions and the absence of a deeper understanding with respect to how these different goods are all ordered to each other in an intelligible way creates conditions which add to the incoherence and muddle of our common human living. Levels and degrees of degradation seep into our human living at different levels and also in terms of how different distinct levels of activity and being are related to each other. While for instance, on the one hand, we speak about the advantages of rapid communication (how rapid communication is of immense help to us in our day), it is also true to say that, as a consequence of rapid communication, a larger number of bad decisions can be made more frequently (their frequency increases) and these same decisions can more rapidly touch the lives of a greater number of people.

Introducing Lonergan's Philosophy of History

As regards the requirements and demands of stewardship, we are accordingly faced with a major dilemma since, for us in our world today, an adequate understanding of responsible human stewardship is not widely known or perhaps, more accurately, we can say that it is not widely available (not widely

⁴ Neil J. Ormerod and Shane Clifton, *Globalization and the Mission of the Church Ecclesiological Investigations* (London: T&T Clark, 2009), p. 6.

accessible to us). We have inherited a Marxist approach about how we should rightly think about the responsibilities of human stewardship and how we are to engage in this stewardship. However, in the context of possibly speaking about globalization from a Canadian point of view, I would like to speak about a contrary philosophy of history which exists as another possible understanding of globalization (an understanding of globalization which comes to us from the thought of a noted Canadian thinker). I refer here to the work of Bernard Lonergan who was born in Canada in 1904 (he died in 1984) and who, in the context of his own time and place, presented a new philosophy of history which was designed to overcome the limitations which we find in the kind of analysis which typifies the thought of Karl Marx and the praxis of persons and groups who use Marx as a guide for the decisions which they would like to make in the stewardship which they must exercise with respect to themselves and the life of other persons and groups. In the context of his own life, it is not to be denied that, in Lonergan's thought, we have a philosophy of history which he proposes as a kind of response or answer, functioning a kind of cure or antidote with respect to the experience of globalization which Lonergan knew in the context of his own day and time.⁵

To say a few words however about Marx, we note that Marx speaks about the value of class conflict and how social conflict exists as a progressive driving force within human history. Within the context of this conflict, public authority should act on behalf of less fortunate persons who tend to have a negligible voice in decisions which touch on possible presences of common good that should be accessible to all persons within a given social order. From Marx's performative philosophy of history, we learn about how, as an initial means, an all powerful state should be used to restructure an economic order within a society where, on the basis of changes which are made in an economic order, other kinds of change can be made in terms of how, together, persons can begin to live their lives within the context of a given society. If we want to speak about effecting changes within the order of human culture or changes within the order of personal human relations, we turn to material conditions and, with respect to material conditions, we make changes (introduce alterations). In Marx, we find a philosophy which emphasizes the importance and the sufficiency of material conditions in the understanding of anything which belongs to our human world since, within this context, it is believed that material conditions explain why changes pertaining to material conditions should lead to proportionate changes as these should exist with respect to the existence of other conditions and the relations which exist among these various conditions. With respect to conditions in general (the existence of every kind of condition), they exist either as material conditions or as functions of material conditions.

As we turn then to the kind of stewardship which has been practiced in the so-called "developed world," we find that, whether we refer to the centralized kind of economic management which had once existed in the old Soviet Union and among its allies or whether we speak about the active role of various governments within western countries who freely interfere in making many economic decisions, we find ways of thinking which are grounded in a philosophy of the human subject which transcends the ideological boundaries which had once existed, separating a communist east from a capitalist west. We can refer to a communist specification of ideal human type which recalls the anticipated being and emergence of a new "Soviet man" or, on the other hand, a free market species of ideal human type which points to the virtue of being a "self-sufficient individual" (becoming or turning into a "self-sufficient" human being). Most prominently, within this greater human context, we find that we are working with an anthropological point of view which holds that the primary drive of human life is constituted by desires for pleasure and the satisfactions which come with experiences of pleasure.

⁵ Bernard Lonergan, Letter of January 22, 1935, addressed to the Rev. Henry Keane, S.J., Provincial of the Upper Canada Province of the Society of Jesus, as cited by Richard M. Liddy, *Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan* (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 1993), p. 84.

Pleasure is viewed as a species of fundamental human right. Hence, in meeting this kind of desire, as soon as this desire is recognized and when it is culturally affirmed to exist as indeed a true and noble good, it becomes a species of first cause or first principle within human life since, from it, we can construct a new economic order: an economic order which is geared toward arousing and satisfying pleasures of many different kinds. We can think here, for example, about the production and supply of certain kinds of food and drink; the design and manufacture of furniture that best serves our desires for ease and comfort; and the design and production of games and other forms of amusement which can be employed as distractions which can take us away from the drudgery of our current preoccupations and any experiences of pain and distress which often accompany us in our mode and manner of living.

When then, as a point of departure in the context of our daily life, pleasure is sought as if it exists as our primary good or if, in our reflections and judgments, it is seen to exist as a primary good, on the basis of this practice and belief, we also have a species of first cause or first principle which serves to determine or to create a new human culture. A new set of meanings comes to exist for us and these justify a way of living that is directed to increasing the many kinds of pleasure which we can possibly have. A hedonistic moral ethic is joined to a hedonistic manner of living and the ultimate first principle within this new human order of things is an understanding of self which is not able to advert to the possible existence of other values or other meanings which are viewed to be uniquely human and which are other than animal (assuming that a real distinction exists between what is human and what is animal or vegetative). A traditional distinction had once distinguished between the acts of a man or the acts of a woman as an acting subject (as if he or she exists as simply a living being) and the acts of a man or the acts of a woman (as if he or she exists as a living human being).⁶ As human beings, we can always engage in actions which can take away or which can detract from the being of our common humanity or, on the other hand, we can engage in actions which add to our humanity (augmenting our humanity, developing it or building it up). However, in a given philosophy of the human subject, this distinction may not exist. It might not be admitted or, perhaps, it is rejected and, as a result, from it, we will be encouraged to build a human world which is less and less human because, increasingly, it is less distinct from the kind of world which we have and which already exists when we refer to the workings of outer physical nature and the natural processes that are distinctive of our natural, physical, external world.

With respect then to a contrary point of view which exists when we refer to Lonergan's philosophy of the human subject (which, in turn, leads to a philosophy of history which is to be equated with an understanding or a philosophy of globalization), instead of a point of departure which points to material conditions and the necessity of our having to satisfy our material wants and desires if we are to enjoy any kind of good, Lonergan points to conditions or variables which are not to be equated with any acts or data of sense. In our lives as human beings, yes, we live within sets of material conditions. We directly encounter these conditions through our acts of sense. However, as living beings, as living beings who happen to be human, we also ask questions about what it is that we are experiencing and whatever is being given to us through our acts of sensing. Our questions spontaneously arise and, as soon as they arise, through our questioning, a kind of distancing occurs within us within the context of

⁶ *Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae, q. 1, aa. 1-3. See also *Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae, q. 18, a. 8, as cited by Martin Rhonheimer, *Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of Moral Autonomy*, trans. Gerald Malsbary (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), p. 420: "the human act, which is called the moral act, obtains its specification from an object related to the principle of human acts, which is the reason." This same point is also stated in other texts: notably, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae, q. 18, a. 5; q. 18, a. 8, ad 2; and Aquinas, *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 4 & ad 5. Citing a pertinent text from the *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 4 (as quoted by Rhonheimer, p. 423): "...good and evil in human actions is considered with regard for how the act accords with reason [*concordat rationis*] as informed by divine law, by nature, or by instruction."

our concrete human living. In other words, through our asking of questions, we begin to disentangle ourselves. We begin to suggest or to indicate to ourselves that we are not fated to be totally absorbed by whatever is being given to us through our acts and data of sense. We cease to be taken up and totally distracted by immediate material concerns as we can begin to turn ourselves towards other things (concerns and interests which are not to be equated with what is given to us through our acts of sense; concerns and interests which are indicated or suggested by the different kinds of questions that we could ask).

In other words, because questioning, as an act, is not an act or an activity of sense; and because, through questioning, we can move beyond what is given to us in our acts and data of sense, we find within our experience of self that we do not exist as a simple consequence of material conditions. Yes, we directly experience our materiality. We experience our physicality (the life of our bodies). We do not exist in a way that exists apart from the presence of material conditions. But, the materiality which exists outside of ourselves and the materiality which we also find as a datum within the experience which we have of ourselves is something that we can begin to alter and change through the questions which we can begin to ask. The presence or the experience of material conditions initially elicits our interest in a way which also points to a spirit of inquiry which exists within ourselves and to everything which can be brought into being as a consequence of how this spirit of inquiry is actuated by us in terms of how we respond to our questions in the living of our human lives. Yes, we must admit that the questions that we pose are influenced by the presence of material conditions. But, these same questions are not determined by material conditions since, at the same time, when we think about our questioning (when we question our questioning), we find that we can ask questions about anything. Nothing cannot be questioned. We can ask questions about ourselves engaged in acts of questioning and our acts of questioning only prove that, beside existing as feeling sensing beings, we also exist as inquiring, seeking beings. Material conditions exist within the context of our human living but these conditions are transcended as soon as we engage in acts of inquiry which belong to another order of being. Within the context of this inquiry and our examination of self, we can begin to distinguish between what exists for us as a material condition and what does not exist for us as a material condition. When we begin to engage in activities which attempt to respond to the questions which we are asking, we discover or perhaps it is best to say that we begin to move into a sphere or realm of being which is constituted by intellectual conditions (intellectual conditions which we can refer to in another way if we want to speak about the presence of spiritual conditions and the existence of spiritual realities). In our language, in various ways, we look for ways which would allow us to speak about what exists in a non-material way.

As a kind of quick proof that we can offer here about the existence of non-material things, please note that, as human beings we live within a world which is subject to the same set of physical laws. The law for the free fall of a falling object (which had been discovered by Galileo in the 17th Century) does not vary as we move from one country to another. If we were to try to discover this law through our own acts of inquiry and investigation, we would always discover the same meaning (we would determine the same set of equations which we would use to express the meaning of this regulative law). But, within our physical world, we find many different human cultures and alternative ways of living in terms of how a given society can be organized. The plurality that we encounter accordingly points to an elasticity or a plasticity which exists in terms of how we can construct our varying human worlds. We can do it in this way or in this other kind of way. In experiencing our questioning, we discover a force or a spirit which exists within ourselves as human beings: a spirit which can exist for us as a creative reality although, as we look at the data of our human history, we can also acknowledge that this same spirit can exist as a destructive thing.

Hence, in the awareness which we have of the different choices which we can make as human beings, in a primitive or initial way, we discover a datum which is the simple givenness of our human freedom. To the degree that we have imagination and an inventive or quick mind, we can multiply the number of choices which we can possibly have in terms of different possible courses of action: different ways of responding to different problems. We are not fated to live in any particular kind of way or to hold certain values or beliefs although, admittedly, in discovering the givenness of this first freedom, we encounter problems about how, in fact, we should properly live. What are we to do with our freedom? How are we to organize ourselves? What are we to do with our lives? What is important and what is not important? Or, in other words, what is of greater importance and what is of lesser importance?

Hence, while we might begin with an awareness of our human freedom as a fundamental datum or a basic point of departure for us in the context of our lives, at some point we should also soon discover that our freedom remains something which we must somehow achieve or work toward. It does not exist as a pure given since it is all too easy for us to make choices which restrict our freedom, leading us to death. If we make bad technological decisions or bad economic decisions and if we are not able to feed ourselves, our physical deaths will soon follow. But, if we make bad decisions with respect to the existence of non-material conditions (I refer to the aforementioned presence of intellectual or spiritual conditions), other kinds of death can also come to us. Death does not exist as a purely physical or material event. Other kinds of death can be experienced since, in our experience of life, it is not to be denied that the experience of one kind of death can lead to other kinds of death. We know that, with physical death, in this world we cannot have any kind of intellectual or spiritual life. But, if we suffer from intellectual or spiritual death or if we participate in the actuation of intellectual or spiritual death, we will create conditions which will encourage a greater frequency or a greater number of physical deaths. With intellectual or spiritual death, life ceases to be worth living. We would want our physical lives to be over as soon as possible. We begin to live our lives in ways that will soon lead to our physical deaths.

The existence of intellectual or spiritual conditions which can change the number and constellation of material conditions accordingly explains why an adequate understanding of globalization requires a normative understanding of the human subject which attends to the primacy of intellectual or spiritual conditions. I say normative since we already know that, in the context of our personal human lives, we can make decisions which can lead either to a rising incidence of death or to enhancements or additions which can be given to our experience of human living. In our day to day existence, we could possibly more easily accept trials and difficulties which frequently come to us (we can make some very painful personal sacrifices) if we can live for purposes and objectives which take us beyond ourselves, orienting or moving us toward experiences of love and relations with other persons which no experience of death can take from us, experiences of love which rejoice in the good and the benefit of other persons and groups (a rejoicing which exists as a kind of presence or a closeness to the being of other persons and groups).⁷ In other words, if we are to move toward an understanding of globalization which would exist as a stimulus for us in terms of how we are to live, encouraging us towards participating or creating a greater common good for the benefit of a larger number of persons, we need to move toward a form of self-understanding which knows about how self-transcendence exists as a fundamental vector within the context of our human lives. Yes, we admit that self-transcendence might not exist to a very great extent in the lives of some persons and groups. It might not exist to a very great extent in the context of our own personal lives. Each of us here must make our own private judgments. However, if we admit that self-transcendence exists as a vector within human living and if we are willing to argue that self-transcendence is not to be regarded as a pathological condition

⁷ Viktor E. Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning*, trans. Ilse Lasch (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), pp. 37-38.

(something which is not right or which is abnormal or defective in some way), we can work toward a general philosophy of human history (an understanding or theory of globalization) which knows about a movement and tension which exists between two vectors which should be clearly distinguished from each other as we turn toward the activities or the performance of our human spirit which, for our purposes, is to be identified with our actions (the subjectivity which we exercise as agents of our history).

In other words, in the context of self-transcendence, we can have progress, expansion, development; and, on the other hand, if we are lacking in self-transcendence (if we live within a praxis or a philosophy of the human subject which encourages a reductionist way of thinking and living that is turned in on itself, which is self-centered or which is self-regarding), we will introduce an ongoing form of decline into the performance of our human living (a progressive decay or a rapid deterioration in the quality of our human living).⁸ Individuals would cease more and more to be of help to each other and the inevitable result will be a growing sense of individual isolation. Individuals would be estranged from each other if no agreements exist about some kind of greater, higher good that persons could work toward in a way that creates bonds and a community which joins persons together in a way which, in its own way, also exists a higher, greater, common good. If we can construct or if we can move into a normative philosophy of the human subject, we might know why some goods are to be preferred to other goods and why some goods are to be regarded as higher goods which require a distinct form of human thinking and understanding which, in turn, leads to a distinctive form of human organization and collaboration if these higher goods are to be worked toward in a way which increases the probability of their achievement. In a context which is grounded in a more adequate form of self-knowledge, we should also know why lesser goods are to be regarded as privations of good (relative to the goodness of higher, greater goods) and why lower orders of good are to be viewed in a manner which points to the need and the value and the necessity of higher goods: the importance and need for their existence if the absence of good in lesser goods is to be remedied in a way which can reshape or reform the inclinations of our human subjectivity, attuning or reconfiguring our enjoyments of lower orders of good in a way which creates conditions that make for an easier reception and a greater enjoyment of goods which belong to a higher order of being. The higher kinds of good which are experienced (which come to us) can then effect changes in the being and character of our subjectivity and, as a result of these changes, lower orders of good will change in terms of what could be their identity, their amount, and their frequency.

If some kind of correlation accordingly exists between our acts as human subjects and the existence of many different kinds of goods which we can make, produce, or enjoy, we find that a simple understanding of the human subject is not to be correlated with a sophisticated understanding which would know about the existence of many different kinds of goods and which would try to discover how different kinds of goods can be properly ordered or related to each other. We have already determined that, in the life of the human subject, we have acts of sense and acts of questioning which are related to each other but which also differ from each other, acts of questioning transcending acts of sensing. We admit too that, from our acts of questioning, we can engage in other kinds of acts which exist as responses that we make to the different kinds of acts of questioning that we engage in. In other words, as we move toward a differentiated understanding of the human subject, by working from an increasingly differentiated understanding of the human subject as a doer and steward of history and to the degree that we succeed in working from a normative or a true understanding of human subjectivity as this applies to all human beings, we will work toward a normative or a true understanding of all the goods that exist as a consequence of our human activity as subjects. An order or pattern which points

⁸ Bernard Lonergan, "Healing and Creating in History," *A Third Collection Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York/Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1985), pp. 104-105.

to the presence of self-transcendence within the life of human subjects points to a like order or a like pattern of transcendence which exists with respect to the goods which exist as a possible consequence of our human activity. We begin to understand why the achievement of certain goods requires achievements which need to exist initially at lower levels: achievements which refer to lesser goods which exist or which function as a preliminary predisposing set of conditions if higher goods are to emerge and to be brought into being. From understanding a hierarchical order which normatively exists within the life of a human subject, we understand a normative hierarchical order which is genuinely constitutive of progress within the gamut of our human history. Self-transcendence within human subjectivity leads to self-transcendence within the fabric of our human history and a responsible administration of stewardship which would be constructive of the fabric of this history.

Self-transcendence in determining a Scale of Values

If, through self-reflection, we begin then with our acts of sense and if we find that our acts of sense are inherently or intrinsically conditioned by our organs of sense and the degree of health which exists in the operation of these organs, we discover a first set of goods which refers to vital kinds of good and a need for a regular supply of these vital goods if our physical well being is to be nourished and maintained. I refer here to repetitive presences of food, drink, clothing, and shelter. Our bodily needs must first be met if, to any extent, we are to enjoy the existence of other kinds of goods. However, as we think about our need for vital goods and as we realize that these vital needs all need to be satisfied in an ongoing, regular way (for example, to live, we usually need three meals a day every day), we advert to how, by our questioning, we can begin to transcend our acts of sense and the bodily kind of existence which conditions our bodily acts of sense. Through our questions, we ask about how “x” can be related to “y.” We find that we want to find links which will reveal to us how a given material condition can be possibly related to another material condition. If, for instance, water is needed on a regular basis for our constant use, through our initial questioning and understanding, we can find how we can construct a system of irrigation that can readily bring water from a remote location to locations which are more proximate to where we happen to be. By asking questions, we engage in inquiries that can possibly lead us toward acts of understanding: acts of direct understanding which suggest that “x” is related to “y” because of something which exists as a kind of “z.” This “z” exists initially as an idea. It is what is grasped as a meaning, it is what is understood by us through a direct act of understanding which transcends what we have when we refer to our prior acts of sensing and questioning. Then, through a later act of understanding which would exist for us as a reflective act of understanding (an act of understanding which exists as a judgment), an understanding which first knows about the being of an idea can then be turned into an understanding which now knows about the being of a truth and, through a truth that is now known, something which is known about an order of being which refers a real order of things. Our acts of direct understanding are all completed (or perhaps we can say that they are all perfected) whenever we move from prior acts of direct understanding toward later acts of judgment which exist in a manner that differs from all that we previously do in order to move toward our earlier acts of direct understanding.

From acts of understanding which accordingly exist in direct acts of understanding and in reflective acts of understanding, from these acts and according to the kind of activity which exists in these acts, we can then speak about the consequences of these acts which exist as a distinct specification of good. Two points bear mention. First, from the intellectuality or the spirituality which is proper to our acts of direct understanding and from the intellectuality or the spirituality which is proper to our acts of reflective understanding, we get a like species of good: something which exists in an intellectual or spiritual way. Second, because every idea points to a possible real relation which would seem to exist between this “x” and this “y,” the ordering which exists through our understanding explains why the

good which exists as a consequence of our understanding is a good which is to be distinguished from the presence of sensible goods. We speak here about goods which are to be identified as “goods of order.” Every good of order which is grasped by our understanding then becomes a basis or a foundation which could lead to the generative of other new goods which could be brought into being if, through the presence of other decisions and actions – in what we do as human subjects -- we positively respond to what we have come first to understand and know in our acts of cognition.

A hierarchy of goods or a hierarchy of values can then be determined if we can refer to an intelligible understood order which indicates how or why one species of good of order is ordered to second species of good of order. In order to supply vital goods (goods of the body) in a recurrent dependable fashion, we need to improve our means of procurement. Perhaps, we can move from a nomadic kind of existence to an agricultural kind of existence. The creation of a technological order accordingly points to a first good of order which exists as a consequence of developments in our technological understanding although, if we then need to find ways to coordinate the distribution of a larger number of material goods which are produced by a more efficient technological order, we will need to ask questions and use our understanding in a way which will lead to the construction of a viable economic order. From advances in economic understanding, we can have new economies which can distribute a larger number of goods to larger numbers of people. However, as our human economies grow in complexity and sophistication and as they require levels of human cooperation that will create conditions that are needed to sustain new levels of economic growth and development, a need for common agreements and decisions leads to questions and acts of understanding which, in turn, lead to the construction of a political good of order. New problems have led to new questions that must be asked if new acts of understanding are to be elicited.

In combining a technological good of order with an economic good of order and in moving to a political good of order, the aggregate or the result is the being of a social order or the existence of a society which is now able to coordinate a large number of many different decisions, the many different decisions pointing to many different kinds of human activity which, ideally, should not conflict with each other (since disruptions and breakdowns would point to a lack of order in what allegedly exists as a functioning good of order). A healthy economy cannot exist for too long a time without a political order which is respected by the bulk of its citizens: a political order which knows how to combine the interests and concerns of many different persons and groups in a way which should eventually lead to a recurring number of mutually acceptable decisions that all are willing to abide by. Economic concerns and questions need to be distinguished from political concerns and questions to avoid confusions which can dampen economic growth and which can also lead to totalitarian forms of government that are not able to attend to the special circumstances which are present in local conditions nor encourage acts of understanding which know about variations or changes in intelligibility that are determinative or which are proper to local conditions. As we discover an order which exists within the self-transcendence of our human understanding, we discover a larger good of order (a more comprehensive good of order) which explains how or why we must move from one good of order to another good of order that is constitutive of our society. In other words, as initial questions lead to the posing of later questions and a change of focus with respect to objects which are intended by our questions, inevitably, at some point, we find that questions are raised about goods which cease to be about goods which are solely defined by our physical or bodily needs (needs which must be met in some way).

In the development of our self-understanding, we have thus realized that the actuation of our human freedom presents itself to us as a kind of task that we must perform (something we must accomplish in some way). We had begun with an initial awareness of our basic freedom and we have moved into a heightened awareness of self which now knows that we must make some difficult decisions about how

our freedom is to be accomplished and, in some way, added to. In other words, beyond our acts of reflective acts of understanding which deal with truths of fact (judging the validity of ideas which come to us through acts of direct understanding, either our own acts of direct understanding or the acts of direct understanding which belong to other persons), from acts of judgments about truths of fact, we must now move towards possible judgments about truths of value as new questions emerge from within ourselves in a way which points to new possible actualizations of our human subjectivity: questions which ask about why we should live in a certain kind of way, or if we could or should live in some other kind of way. For instance, we might begin to realize that there are different ways to make a living. We have believed in the value of having certain goods. We have believed that we need this material good and then this other material good if we are to be happy. But, after enjoying these goods, we have been experiencing degrees of dissatisfaction. We are not entirely happy. Something is not quite right. And so, we begin to wonder if we really need the goods which, in the past, we have wanted. Are these goods a real source of happiness for ourselves? Or, are there are other goods (other kinds of good) that we should seek? Can we do without the goods that we have previously wanted and enjoyed?

Hence, as new questions arise about goods which exist as goods of value (goods of value which we can refer to as goods of meaning or goods of purpose), we discover another sphere or mode of subjective human consciousness which has moved beyond any understanding and knowledge of facts toward an understanding and knowledge of values which function, for us, as a point of departure for acts or decisions which belong to an order of execution (an order of doing or an order of implementation which is consequent or which typically follows from activities which refer to acts or activities which are constitutive of what we do in our acts of sensing, understanding, and judging). As we enter into judgments which decide about questions which directly refer to what could be a good or true meaning or a good and true purpose, we begin to construct a human order of being which now refers to the presence of a culture. Every culture exists as a set of values which indicate what we approve of and what we do not approve of. Every culture tends to believe that only it knows what is truly good for us and what is truly bad for us and it also assumes that other cultures do not correctly know what is truly good and what is truly bad for us as human subjects and how we should distinguish between what is good for us and what is bad for us. If we find variations within the economic or the political order of our lives, we also find variations with the order of our human culture. Every distinct culture encourages ways of behaving which link persons together in the context of some kind of interpersonal relation and every culture also sanctions behaviors which are seen to be dangerous. We can change how persons relate to each other within a given social order if we can initiate changes within a given human culture. From changes within the order of our culture, it should be obvious to us that we can initiate very many changes as these can exist within the context of any given human society.

However, as we attend to the kinds of questions which we ask about the meaning and the purpose of our human lives, within this higher sphere of human consciousness (Lonergan distinguishes four levels of human consciousness in his analysis of the human subject: experiencing or sensing, direct understanding, judgments of fact, and judgments of value), we find an internal differentiation within this level of consciousness which refers to judgments about meaning. Cultures exist in response to questions which ask about the meaning and purpose of our lives. We admit, for instance, that truth exists as a good. Through our ethical and moral deliberations, we can begin to realize that truth exists as a distinct good and that we ought to try and pursue it (to acquire it in some way). The search for understanding and truth is strengthened if it is backed by a moral and cultural judgment which says that truth exists as a distinct value (as a distinct good) which should be pursued. The search for understanding and truth can bring persons into contact with each other and the result could be a new ordering of persons within a given society: an ordering which is the existence of a new human community. A social order is reconfigured and changed in some way. Perhaps, we can say that it is

being added to. It is being augmented.

However, as cultural changes lead to social changes and new orderings of persons in terms of how different individuals are encouraged to relate to each other in ways that could lead to forms of cooperation that can suggest the need and the value of friendship, the requirements and demands of close collaboration can lead to a set of new questions which point to the significance (the possible presence) of a higher value: a species of good which is the good or value of other human beings. Cultural goods are transcended by the value of personal goods (goods of person) which acknowledge how, through friendship and acts of mutual help and encouragement, it is possible for us to transcend limitations which are often imposed by cultural determinations of meaning: restrictions which can exist for us as a consequence of prevailing cultural judgments which tend to norm our behavior, indicating to us what actions which we should do good and what actions we should avoid. Every society has a culture which, as a principle of movement, functions as its soul. However, if some cultural determinations of meaning should be regarded with a degree of suspicion (cultural determinations are subject to revision), goods of person can function as a point of departure for criticisms which can lead to cultural changes which, in turn, can change the order which exists within a given society. As we have attended to Lonergan's philosophy of the human subject and in speaking about how an understanding of globalization can be derived from this philosophy as a determination of it, we have argued that a right understanding of the human person is fundamental if we are to move toward a wiser understanding of globalization and the kind of stewardship which should exist for us in the administration of our human affairs. Our human world allegedly exists in order to meet human needs and ends: the good of human beings who live together within community or who should try to live together within a community. Within this context, as it stands, the good of persons comes across to us as the highest kind of possible good.

However, if we return to a point of departure which refers to the further asking of human questions and if we refer to questions which could ask about goods or values which transcend our contingent human order, we can speak about a further specification of human consciousness which knows about the existence of transcendent goods. These goods exist in a manner which is not subject to our human control (our possible human manipulation). Hence, for this reason, we speak here about the goods of religion: realities or goods which exist outside of ourselves but which can possibly exercise an influence on our human affairs (acting from without in a way that can transform our human world, mysteriously changing it from within): revealing to us how we can possibly live in a manner which totally differs from everything before which, before, we have known. Admittedly, yes, we do not understand how or why transcendent sources of meaning can be said to exist. The questions that we ask present themselves. Our questions point to a kind of yearning which exists within ourselves: a yearning which points to a form of fulfillment which the things of this world are not able to give.

Hence, as we think about the possible role of transcendent meaning in human life, with Lonergan, we can speak about a third possible vector which exists within our human history: a third vector which should be included if we are to move toward a fuller, more adequate understanding of globalization. In our human world, we encounter problems and difficulties which do not appear to have any kind of adequate human solution. For example, if we think about the needs and requirements of justice, we acknowledge that justice is a human good. If person "x" has been harmed by person "y," person "y" needs to offer some kind of compensation. The compensation tends to exist as some kind of punishment. However, what is to be done when person "y" cannot offer a form of compensation which is commensurate with the wrong done? Wrongs are committed which transcend our human ability to effect any corrections. Our judicial procedures fall short. And so, as we encounter problems and difficulties which we cannot make right through some kind of human engineering, we find that the

goods of religion exist as a possible solution: a new possible point of departure which, if accepted, can create new conditions that touch on how persons relate to each other and the kinds of cultural values which can govern how a society is to understand the kind of order which it should have. If, in our human affairs, we can have progress and decline, through a further specification of self-transcendence which belongs to the human spirit, we can have a form of healing which comes to us through a form of redemption or salvation that is given to us as a kind of gift from above. A complete understanding of human history which is to be equated with a complete understanding of globalization refers to the presence of progress, decline, and redemption.

Summary

In Lonergan's philosophy of the human subject, we have a general theory of globalization which works from a somewhat complex understanding of the human subject. Material conditions are mated with other kinds of conditions although in a manner which points to a priority of conditions which possess an intellectual or spiritual nature. To fully understand these conditions, we work with a form of self-reflection which knows that acts of understanding, as acts, always distance themselves from the presence of material conditions. A normative scale of values or goods is determined from a normative understanding of self-transcendence as this exists as a principle within human life. The consequent presence of a larger number of distinctions reduces the number of confusions which often exist when difficult decisions are to be made in the conduct of human affairs. It is not easy to make painful, critical choices. When progress and decline is linked with a possible supernatural solution for intractable human problems, a more optimistic view of our human future can begin to arise within our consciousness of self and world.

With respect specifically to an understanding of globalization from a Canadian viewpoint, Lonergan's understanding of globalization can be seen as a kind of response which he gives to the circumstances of his time and place. And, with respect to this context, Canadians do not have a strong sense of national or ethnic identity. They are not motivated by a sense of purpose or mission that they might want to communicate to others. By way of contrast, it has been said about Americans that they believe in what is referred to as the "American dream." America is a place where a person can go and make it. To make it is grow in wealth and prosperity. Fame is also a distinct possibility. It is said too that America has a destiny...a manifest destiny. And so, in order to escape from this kind of influence, Canadians see themselves as internationalists. The world is dominated by a number of major powers although now there is only one superpower: the US. And so, within this world of tensions, one tries to play a mediating, moderating role. Where tensions exist, one encourages dialogue. One tries to bring persons and groups to the negotiating table. One tries to bring other persons toward a wider point of view: a sense of reality which transcends individual and group interests. Nationalism is not seen in an entirely positive way. Its ill effects are only too apparent to anyone who is a student of history. Hence, if it is said that Canadian foreign policy is something which exists "on the side of the angels," we can perhaps say that Lonergan's understanding of globalization is a point of view which reflects this peculiar point of view. The kind of self-transcendence which we find in Lonergan's understanding of human history is matched, to some extent, by a kind of self-transcendence that one can find in how Canadians relate themselves to other peoples and nations. One tries to get along with others and to find common points of view. Instead of a focus that is determined by "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," one tries for something that is more modest: "peace, order, and good government."