

Accidents as a Specification of Internal Relation in the Context of Lonergan's Thought

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In the context of Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of internal relations as this exists within the context of his speculative, systematic theology of the Christian Trinity,¹ an initial, first argument attends to something which is known to exist allegedly as an accident (in other words: as a property, a conjugate, or a qualifying variable which cannot exist apart from something to which it applies or to which it refers in some way).² Certain things cannot exist other than by being within or part of something else. The “something else” would, however, exist in a way which is other than being an accident. How certain things exist in one way differs from how other things exist in another way.

As a first point of clarification then, the referent that is being cited here in terms of accident pertains to a real accident as opposed to any other kind of accident: whether we should refer to (1) a material kind of accident (as, for instance, the “barkness” or the bark which belongs to a tree; bark which grows and which belongs to a tree); or (2) an ideal, supposed, or hypothetical kind of accident (as we can find this if we should refer to a supposition or a belief which would commonly hold that heavier objects always fall with a greater speed than lighter objects, or they should always fall with a greater speed than any lighter objects: a direct proportionate relation always exists between weight and speed). An accident exists as some kind of qualification or modification that pertains to the being of a given thing or which exists inwardly within the being of a given thing.³ Simply put at the moment: first a thing or a substance and then an accident, whether these be one or many. In our context thus, a real modification must suppose either one of two things: (1) the reality of something that is being modified or qualified in some way (as a cause acts on another to produce a contingent effect, a contingent cause leading to a contingent effect); or (2) the reality of something which exists in the way which it does in terms of how it exists with a modification or a qualification which, normally, it always has and possesses. A given kind of thing, as a thing or substance, has a nature, an intelligibility, or an essence which inherently, if it is understood and known, points to an order of accidents or conjugates which it should normally always have.⁴ Hence, some accidents are proper to a given thing's being while others are not. Rocks, stones, for instance, tend, relatively, either to be stationary in their position and location or to move downwards instead of upwards. Some accidents obviously exist in an internal kind of way while others exist in an external kind of way. If, for instance, we exist as human beings, then it properly belongs to us that we are qualified by a set of accidents that are proper to us as human subjects. In our subjectivity for instance, it is right and proper for us that we should be curious about different things, curious about what is given to us in our external experience of many different things: we go on to ask and pose questions and we are open to receiving any acts of understanding that could be possibly given to us if

¹See Bernard Lonergan, *Triune God: Systematics*, eds. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, trans. Michael G. Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), pp. 687-697.

²When Aristotle uses *symbebēkos* to speak about accidents, note its original etymological significance: it exists as a “going along with” or an “occurring with.” Cf. Joseph Owens, *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Houston, Texas: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1985), p. 155.

³Lonergan, *Triune God: Systematics*, p. 689; Owens, *Elementary Christian Metaphysics*, p. 144.

⁴In his conceptuality, when Lonergan employs “conjugate” instead of “accident” or the adjective “accidental,” readers are encouraged to think more readily about how one term of meaning is connected to another term of meaning in a manner which is inherently intelligible and also about how this type of meaning is not so readily communicated when, in our choice of language, we should speak about accidents and not about conjugates.

our questions are to be properly answered.⁵ It is also proper for us as human beings to engage in acts of sensing which interact with our acts of understanding in order to effect growths and increments in our human acts of cognition. A certain kind of thinking and reasoning always belongs to us as human subjects though this reasoning and knowledge might not always be operative, in a given condition of act. To exist listlessly and lethargically, however, refers to another kind of accident: to a quality which we would have to regard as something which is not right or proper for us as human beings (though it exists and often somewhat too frequently it exists). To give another example: it is also not proper for us, as human beings, that we should each have a particular color of hair or a particular color of skin although it is proper for us as human beings to have both some kind of hair color and some kind of skin color. Again, some accidents are proper; others are circumstantial. Among circumstantial accidents, some can be said to be so improper that they are to be regarded as violent.⁶

If we suppose our experience of the world that we happen to live within, and if we move from a notion or an expectation of accident that is determined by the kind of given which belongs to us in our different acts of human sensing (as in the initial, preliminary notion of accident that we find in Aristotle's *Ten Categories* which refers to how things called "substances" are to be described, with this or that attribute, and labelled, with this or that designation)⁷ – if, instead, we move toward another

⁵See Bernard Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, trans. Michael G. Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), p. 51.

⁶We note a traditional distinction which contrasts proper accidents with improper or violent accidents. It is proper for human beings, it is an intelligent and rational thing for human beings to ask questions and to receive acts of understanding. But, it is not proper, it is not an intelligent and rational thing for human beings to be treated in a disrespectful, disgraceful manner (to be subjected to various forms of degradation that take away from the goodness of our human living despite how often this may happen to us the course of our lives as human beings).

⁷In his *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), p. 420, Lonergan speaks about Aristotle's ten categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, place, time, posture, and habit) in a way which attests to their heuristic descriptive character and to the kind of value which belongs to this type of attentiveness which belongs to the good of our different acts of human perception.

A naturalist will assign the genus, species, and instance (substance) of an animal, its size and weight (quantity), its color, shape, abilities, propensities (quality), its similarities to other animals and its differences from them (relation), its performance and susceptibilities (action and passion), its habitat and seasonal changes (place and time), its mode of motion and rest (posture), and its possession of such items as claws, talons, hooves, fur, feathers, horns (habit).

Later, in his *Understanding and Being: the Halifax Lectures on Insight*, eds. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli; revised and augmented by Frederick E. Crowe with the collaboration of Elizabeth A. Morelli, Mark D. Morelli, Robert M. Doran, and Thomas V. Daly (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), p. 199, Lonergan speaks about Aristotle's categories in the following terms:

We arrive at Aristotle's categories most simply by going into the woods, meeting animals, and asking, What kind of an animal is this? How big is it? What is its color? What relations does it have? and so on. They are categories of descriptive knowledge, and descriptive

notion of accident which is determined or which is specified by a nature or an intelligibility which belongs and which is grasped by us through our reception of a supervening, self-transcending act of understanding,⁸ a new sense, a new meaning or definition of accident emerges in terms of how it exists now as another kind of correlative, belonging now to the given of an abstracting act of understanding. We would cease to hold to a sense, a notion, or an assumption which had been inclined to believe that accidents are known and determined by the kinds of given that are received by us through our different acts of human sensing.

Through a kind of shift which occurs thus, within the new and larger context of a non-descriptive, explanatory act of understanding (and emanating from this liberating, energizing act of understanding),

knowledge is science in a preliminary stage. It is something entirely different from science that has reached its explanatory stage. Aristotle himself had a very clear idea of the difference between these descriptive categories, which he sets up in an elementary work, and causes; consequently, he thinks of science as knowledge through causes. However, there has been a tendency to conceive of metaphysics as knowledge, not through causes, but through the predicaments. On the other hand, if one conceives metaphysics as concerned with the total heuristic structure of proportionate being [being defined as what of reality can be known by human acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging], one must be concerned with causes and not at all with predicaments, because a heuristic structure aims at what is known through understanding.

If we should go back earlier and attend to the teaching of St. Augustine about how accidents are to be understood, we find an understanding of accidents which points to how they exist as descriptive determinations. As Augustine notes in his *Confessions*, 4, 28:

The book [*The Ten Categories*] seemed to me to speak clearly enough of substances, such as a man is, and of what are in them, such as a man's figure; of what quality he is; his stature; how many feet tall he is; his relationships, as whose brother he is; where he is placed; when he was born; whether he stands or sits; whether he is shod with shoes or armed; whether he does something or has something done to him; and the innumerable things that are found in these nine categories, of which I have set down some examples, or in the category of substance.

Applying this understanding of accidents to how we might then speak about St. Augustine in terms his own properties and characteristics, Augustine existing as a distinct substance or thing (and not as some other substance or thing), we get the following result:

Thus Augustine himself through the course of his life grew in size: an instance of the category of quantity. He acquired certain vicious habits that were in time replaced by virtues. He acquired great skill as a writer and great learning: virtues, vices, skill, and the like come under the heading of quality, as do colors and certain other aspects of our being. Augustine was taught by other men (passion) and he in turn instructed students (action). He existed at different moments (time) and in many places (place). He had countless relations with others; men and other things. He was a son, a brother, a father, a disciple, a master, a priest, and a bishop (relation). He was clothed in various ways

in the genesis and in the experience of this new sort of sense or definition of that which could exist as a qualifying accident, a different result ensues: first, initially and immediately within the data of our inner understanding experience, an inwardly experienced, apprehended *inner word or concept* is given to us within the larger awareness of our intellectual consciousness (within our inner sense of self and world). Something new, something different, something other now exists before us (within us) which differs from us (though we do not perceive it since it does not exist as a datum of sense). However, in our experience of it as something which is other and different, we can begin to think about it as if it were apart and different from ourselves. We can begin to think more and more about what it could possibly be. We can inquire into it, posing new questions about it. We can ask about its possible reality or truth, or about how it could be related to something else that we might know, believe, or understand in another context. Following and emerging in the wake of an initial act of understanding (we refer here to the relevance of a direct act of understanding), an act of understanding with respect to its term, as it terminates in something which is being understood, has been turned into an experience of another kind of other when that which is understood in a comprehended apprehension of it comes to exist and to emerge as the term of another, inner type of human intellectual experience (as, now, a conceptualizing act of understanding as an *act of conception* proceeds and follows from the fertility of a prior act of grasping understanding).

For a sense of this shift that we can find within the order of our inner conscious experience: contrast an act of understanding which solves a specific problem in geometry (which pertains to a relation between lines and angles) and also a sense or an awareness which immediately realizes and knows that, in solving a given mathematical problem (this “x” must be equal to this “y”), we immediately find that we are confronted or that we exist and are in the presence of a previously unknown, invariant law in mathematics which perhaps should be noted and investigated, spelled out and better understood in a way that can fully grasp its meaning and significance. One good portends to another.

and equipped with tools or armor at different times (habit, in the sense of wearing a monk’s habit or a soldier’s uniform). He assumed various positions, such as kneeling in prayer (posture).

See Augustine, *The Confessions of St. Augustine*, trans. John K. Ryan (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 380-1, n. 2.

8See Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 6, ad 2; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, 4, 11, 15 where he argues that descriptive conjugates differ from explanatory conjugates. “External accidents [*exteriorum accidentium*]” do not reveal why a thing exists as it exists with the descriptive conjugates that, in fact, it happens to have. They fail to reveal a thing’s inner essence, intelligibility, reason, or nature (its quiddity [*quidditatem rei*], its “whatness”): what a thing is with respect to its inherent intelligibility, its meaning or form, why it is what it is. Quoting further from the *De Veritate*: “When sense knows a thing through a form received from things, it does not know it as effectively as the intellect. Sense is led through it to a knowledge of external accidents but the intellect reaches to the essential quiddity of a thing.” Whenever Aquinas speaks about exterior accidents, implicitly, he works from a distinction which knows about the possible existence of interior accidents: accidents which cannot be known through any acts of sensing but which can only be known through our acts of understanding. Exterior accidents always refer to the order of description; interior accidents, the order of explanation. In his *Insight*, p. 462, Lonergan explicitly speaks about conjugates and in a context that distinguishes between exterior and interior conjugates.

Derivatively then from this kind of inner, intellectual awareness, a communicable, outer word or worded proposition and sentence can then be formed and constructed as we move into our acts of speech and articulation in a transposition of terms and concepts which occurs as soon as we work with verbal and written words and signs in ways that can lead to the enunciation and the construction of pertinent definitions as our need for them arises (if we are to grow in our understanding and knowledge of many other different things). Our new understandings of newly apprehended things, as these lead us to experience new inner words and concepts, point to the good and the desirability of our possibly effecting salutary changes in ourselves in terms of how we would want to speak and talk with each other as communicating, questioning, human subjects. The changes which occur in our inner and outer language condition and point us toward changes that we can begin to think about and possibly make in whatever other acts could follow and emerge in the course of our human lives.

Hence, within this context of emergent understanding whose terms and connections are not seen (since, instead, they are understood and they are experienced when and as they are understood): accidents as accidental natures (whether they are proper or improper), in their meaning and intelligibility, necessarily suppose the meaning or the intelligibility of things that cannot be understood as if we were to think of them as properties or accidents. In our thinking about accidents, we find that we must also immediately begin to suppose and think about the being of something that markedly differs from how accidents themselves exist: having a nature which would have to exist as a non-accidental nature that, for reasons of convenience, we can refer to as a “thing” type of nature or as a substantial kind of nature. Our choice of words depends on associations of meaning that, perhaps, we would like to avoid and other meanings also that we would like to encourage and foster.

Granting then any success on our part, in apprehending a definition or a concept which speaks about what a given accident is in terms of its inner nature or intelligibility, and granting too how, in its intelligibility, an accidental concept of nature implies or points to a substantial concept of nature, in a context which then asks questions that can possibly lead us toward the good of some kind of sufficiently satisfactory verification and affirmation, from within or through the mediating kind of order which exists within our acts of sensing, questioning, thinking, understanding, and judgment, the experience, meaning, and truth of accidental qualifications accordingly immediately points to the *real being of things* which exist in a way that is bereft or which exists apart from any kind of modification or qualification. The intelligibility of apprehended accidents points to the intelligibility of things which must exist in a contrary but complementary way as the being of distinct substances. In their own right as intelligibilities, they cannot be seen or experienced by any of our different acts of human sensing. Simply put: our sensing goes with things which exist as bodies; our understanding, with things which exist as substances as we transition from our acts of sensing into our acts of understanding. We move or we try to move from a sensible notion of substance that we find in Aristotle's *Ten Categories* to an intelligible notion of substance that we can also find in Aristotle's texts as we attend to how, in an act of understanding, sensible objects (as bodies) and attendant sensible determinations and limitations are removed and put to the side through the mediation of our acts of inquiry and cognition with the result being the emergence of a new type of cognitive union: instead of a union between a sensible, sensed object and an act of sensing which knows bodies, a union between an intelligible object and an act of understanding which exists within an understanding, human subject. Between an understander and an understood, a new species of identity can be affirmed and noted. It exists and rightly does it exist,⁹ and it differs from the first species of identity which had belonged to us if we had limited our attention to the being of a sensing subject and whatever is being sensed by us as sensing subjects.

⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 9, 1074b 36-38; Aquinas, *In XII Metaphysics*, lecture 11, section 2619.

Relative then to things which exist as accidents, other things simply exist or be (where that which exists without being an aspect or a part of something else must refer to the simple or to the mere existence of something which would then exist as a substance, or as a distinct thing), and so we only get into accidents and we only know about accidents (we find and encounter accidents) if we can begin to speak about how, beyond the existence of things, something exists in some kind of limited, restricted, conditioned kind of way. Heuristically, we have already distinguished between the being of substantial forms and the being of accidental forms where each implies the other. Apart thus from our speaking about the being of things: beyond the being or the existence of any given thing or, more accurately, besides the mere given being of an existing thing, we tend to encounter determinations which exist in their own right as forms (whatever the species or type of form). Formal being differs from real being although, typically but not always or invariantly, being and form accompany each other where each would seem to imply and to point to the other. Metaphysically or ontologically, apart from ourselves and the order of our learning: first the substance or the being of a given thing and then the accidents (as formal qualifications of a given thing or substance) if nothing exists without having some kind of determination or some kind of qualification although on the other hand however, cognitively, as we have been noticing, as necessarily we move from our acts of sensing into our acts of understanding, we begin with something which exists as a body and with all or some of its sensible qualities and characteristics. Only as we work with something which exists as a body and with its sensible characteristics can we perhaps come to something which exists as a distinct substance or thing and with the explanatory accidents that distinctively and properly belong to it. Through our knowing about the being of these explanatory accidents (the givenness of accidental forms), we can begin to know about the intelligible being of a substance in terms of what could be its substantial form. To speak a bit more accurately here (and with a degree of summary and repetition), the existence of an accident *as a reality* immediately points to the existence of a substance *as a reality*; although on the other hand however, if we should only attend to the meaning or the intelligibility of forms and not to the real being of forms, the form of an accident immediately points to the form of a substance. The form of a thing as form differs from the being or the reality of a given thing until or unless we come to some other thing which exists in a completely simple way, there being no distinction which can be drawn between that which exists in terms of formal being and that which exists in terms of real being.

To refer to ourselves as illustrative, convenient examples: as human beings, we find that we exist in a way which would seem to point to our independence and to the good of our autonomy although, on the other hand however, we should also notice that, if we are to understand our independence in ways which will avoid unneeded confusions and contradictions (or any form of exaggeration that could lead to some form of false absolutization), we must advert to how our existence and our independence is not bereft of limits or qualifications which would exist as our proper human accidents. We cannot exist apart from our accidental limitations, our accidental determinations: properties which detract from our individuality in terms of its alleged independence and self-sufficiency and, yet too, in conjunction and union with other properties which also add and point to the good of our individuality, making for the possibility and the reality of our distinct, human individuality. Reiteratively speaking: to think about accidents in a manner which is geared to our receiving any possible acts of understanding that could be possibly given to us and then to speak about accidents or conjugates always supposes that we must be speaking about things which would have to exist as substances.

To avoid any possible misunderstanding here, in the context of a real distinction which merits special focus and emphasis, to avoid confusions, our understanding and knowledge needs to know that the

principle of form as the principle of intelligibility or as the being of intelligibility (encompassing everything which exists as meaning and intelligibility) is not to be confused with the principle of act as the reality of a thing's existence (or the reality of a thing's being): existence or being as an instantiating act of being or as an instantiating act of existence. The two radically differ: intelligibility and being (being as act of being or as the effecting of being). They are not the same since intelligibility only implies or suggests the good of existence without necessitating the factuality or the givenness of any given existence: existence as real being or as real existence. Things exist in our world which perhaps should not be or exist at all. No reason exists. No intelligibility can be found. Absence of rationality abounds (all too frequently). Conversely too, intelligibility can exist and it often exists but not necessarily in or through or within any kind of existing instantiation when we would say that, yes, this exists with this intelligibility or that, yes, that exists with this other intelligibility. Despite the kind of completeness which belongs or which exists in our experiences of intelligibility, if acts of being are somehow absent and not present, the completeness of intelligibility is somehow lacking if we attend to another species of completeness which, possibly, it could also have if we move into affirmations of intelligibility (as in apprehensions of telling evidence) that, in turn, point to affirmations which can say that, yes, this "x" really and truly exists. In our world, more exists than the meaning of a form.

To illustrate our point a bit more in a way which points to the priority of a thing or substance and how we can think about this priority of a thing or substance, if the being of a thing differs from how a given thing exists in terms of its accidents or conjugates, on the basis of this difference, we can distinguish between how a human being exists as a substance and how, more or less, a human being can also exist as a subject and commonly exists as a subject.¹⁰ Substance differs from subject but, apart from substance or substantiality, there can be no subject; no subjectivity.

On the one hand, although we exist as finite beings, as finite substances (because we do not cause ourselves in terms of our being and substance and finitude refers to the truth and the presence of an accident), in the existence which we have simply as existing, we exist in a way which says that we do not exist as a part or as an aspect of something else. We simply are. We simply be. However, upon further examination, we find that we tend to exist or that, in fact, we exist in both a substantial and a subjective way. We differ from each other as subjects although less so or not so in simply our "thingness" as substances. In our subjectivity, an order of accidents exists which belongs to our substantiality (our "thingness") while, at the same time, these same accidents transcend or they are more than our "thingness" or our substantiality. The subjectivity cannot exist apart from our substantiality and "thingness" and this subjectivity accordingly points to differences and variabilities (changes in passivities and activities in changes of qualifying accidents) which indicate how, in us, change and absence of change both mutually exist together (subject and substance). One does not deny or reject the other.

Our different asking of questions points to how our consciousness of self varies from one individual to another and, yet, we know that we exist in ways that can be totally lacking in any kind of consciousness or in any kind of self-awareness. Experiences of dreamless sleep are given to us although, within the context of our acts of dreamless sleep, we experience nothing: not even the condition of our consciousness in terms of

¹⁰See how Lonergan discusses this question in "The Subject," in *A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan*, S. J., eds. William Fr. J. Ryan, S. J. and Bernard J. Tyrell (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974) pp. 69-86.

our dreamlessness. Our existence in ways which point to an occasional lack of subjectivity accordingly points to how, within the order of things, we must first exist as substances before we can have anything else which belongs to us. We exist as substances before we can exist with our accidents as living, conscious subjects although, admittedly, we can only know about the prior reality of our substantial being if we can begin with the reality of our accidental being: with our consciousness of self and with the interior data of our consciousness which obviously and immediately points to the kind of consciousness that we happen to have *as human subjects* as, now, we try to move from the kind of priority which belongs to ourselves as things or substances toward or into the other kind of priority which also belongs to us if we can attend to how we are first given to ourselves through how we experience ourselves in the experience which we have of our individual awareness and consciousness. Again, reiteratively, our substantial reality never changes while our accidental reality is always shifting and changing. Modifications of being (with respect to the character or the quality of our being) are continually occurring or they can continually occur without there being any change at all in how we simply exist as substances. The intimacy of how, without contradiction, change and absence of change exist and relate to each other, in turn, points to an intimacy of relation and connection between the two which, in turn, points to the primacy of how a formative, constitutive, internal relation exists as a prior, necessary condition if a fullness of reality is to belong to us with respect to both our being and our humanity (in admittedly different ways) as we refer to the being of accidents in our subjectivity and to the being of ourselves as substances. An internal relation exists as a grounding species of reality: hence, as a precondition if anything is to exist at all in terms of both its conditions of integrity and unity and its conditions of variety and difference (unity and diversity, the two going together).

The correlation of form with intelligibility and meaning accordingly explains why acts of being or acts of existence exist in a way which differs: in a way which transcends the order and being of meaning, significance, or intelligibility without, however, the necessity of there being any kind of conflict with how meaning and intelligibility exist and the kind of luminosity which exists in the wake of the meaningfulness of form and the apprehension of intelligibility. This difference explains why we must speak with a degree of caution and circumspection and so be open to realizing that the simple being of a thing (as a substance or thing), while not lacking in meaning and intelligibility, is more or quite other than the condition and the givenness of its meaning and intelligibility. Reiteratively, the substantial nature of a substance or thing is not to be equated with the substantial being of a substance or thing. A substantial nature *qua* intelligibility refers to a thing's being without having to be equivalent to the reality of a thing's being (to the reality of its existence, as much or as often as we might know and realize that lack of intelligibility suggests and implies a corresponding lack of being although not in terms of an implication which would have to require some kind of necessity which would have to exist for us as a foregone conclusion). Strictly speaking, intelligibility implies being without requiring or necessitating any givenness or presence of being. Some things simply exist for reasons that we cannot discover and know about and, speculatively, we can perhaps say that they exist for no reason other than that which could be their possible value and goodness. Some things are good simply because they exist. Hence, as we would try to propose and argue, as the goodness of an existing thing elicits positive affective responses from us from within the mass of our emotions and feeling, we can say that "the heart has reasons [that] the mind knows nothing of," if this quotation in its claim and affirmation (which is taken from the mediations of French mathematician, Blaise Pascal) is of some value for us in what we are trying now to say to ourselves within our current given context. We tend to suppose, or to attribute, or to presume reasons if we cannot find and experience them as the issue and term of

anything which could exist as an apprehended, received act of understanding. Some things exist in a manner which transcends the kind of determination which belongs to the implication, significance, and meaning of any given form, and the possible existence of these other, new things can be a source of hope for us to the degree that determinisms of meaning and form can be escaped or sometimes possibly evaded and avoided.

Possibly also, for other reasons of clarity and to avoid any possible confusions, we should advert and enter into a discussion about a terminological, a material, or a conceptual difference whose existence we cannot deny or gainsay: while to date, in our inherited, traditional language and conceptuality, since Aristotle, we have tended to speak about the reality of substances, in our more current ways of speaking and writing, we can speak about these substances in terms of how they exist as things.¹¹ We give “thing” a technical significance. Substance is thing; thing, substance. To reiterate the importance of a key difference (a key differentiation), a thing (or a substance) always differs from anything which exists as a body if a body exists as the term of an act of sensing and a thing, as the term of an act of understanding (our acts of sensing tending to exist more frequently than any of our acts of understanding). A positive relation always exists between a body and a thing but not an identity since it is only by means of an understanding of bodies that we can then move toward an apprehension and an affirmation of reality which would exist as a distinct thing or substance. Substances explain bodies and the kind of appearance that they can have; but not bodies, substances. Absent acts of understanding and we cannot speak in an intelligent way about anything which would exist as a substance. Too easily we try to imagine or picture what a given substance or thing could possibly look like.

The mutual implication which accordingly exists in terms of substances and accidents (or, alternatively, things and conjugates) accordingly explains why we must speak about how an internal relation exists as a kind of constitutive, grounding, prior necessity if, somewhat vaguely or indeterminately, other things are to exist in any kind of differentiated way. It properly belongs; an internal relation properly belongs to the being of at least two different things or two different aspects, whatever words or terms that we would want to use (making for both the reality of a substance and the reality of an accident; a thing and a conjugate); and the internal relation, as an indissoluble unity and as it is known and discovered, also points to a kindred form of indissoluble unity which exists within ourselves as we point to how our acts of cognition exist as an ongoing form of interaction which constantly exists among and between our different acts of human sensing, our different acts of human inquiry, and our different acts of human understanding. An internal relation exists not only as a reality that can be known more fully when it is

¹¹Please note that it is no easy task to understand Aristotle's notion of substance and accident and then see how Lonergan takes this notion and transposes it when, in his *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, he speaks about thing and conjugate and not about substance and accident. The conception differs although, if we understand why the conception differs, we will understand why Lonergan's understanding of thing and conjugate can be regarded as a legitimate development with respect to what Aristotle had been attempting to say when speaking about the meaning of substance and accident and how they differ from each other in the meaning which each has. See what Lonergan says in his “*Insight Revisited*,” *Second Collection*, p. 272, for some brief remarks that distinguish Aristotle's notion of substance from Lonergan's notion of substance and how Lonergan's notion of thing can be viewed as an understanding that goes beyond what Aristotle had understood when speaking about his notion of substance. Aristotle's analysis would seem to establish a clearer link between that which exists as substance and our descriptive use of ordinary language than a link that would exist with our acts of understanding and a different kind of language that would be needed if we are to speak about substances within the scope of an explanatory context.

adverted to, pondered, and considered (understood and judged) but, necessarily also, it exists for us as a fundamental species of heuristic presupposition and anticipation as we move from ourselves in our being and experience toward the being of other things: from our experienced effects that we encounter toward a likely, probable apprehension of causes and as, conversely and alternatively, we also move from our apprehension of causes toward the order of effects and the many effects that can be possibly found if we should move from the postulation and the being of an operative, effective, efficient cause. Effects tend to be more multiple than causes since, from few causes, a very large number of effects can possibly emerge, exist, and be.

To reduce effects to any given cause requires moving from our many different acts of human sensing toward a kind of refinement which exists whenever our acts of sensing are replaced or, more properly, whenever they are supplemented and transcended by us through the medium of our acts of inquiry and understanding. As we have been already noting and noticing, our acts of sensing more frequently occur than the kind of occurrence which belongs to our acts of understanding. If an ongoing interaction exists between our acts of sensing and our acts of understanding in this kind of internal relation which is distinctive of how, subjectively, our human cognition exists amongst us as human beings (to the degree that we all exist as healthy individuals), so too, as the interaction between the data of sense and our inquiry moves into the interaction which exists between the data of our consciousness and our acts of inquiry, another related internal relation reveals itself: an ongoing interaction which exists between our analytic acts of reasoning (as we move from effects to causes) and our synthetic acts of reasoning (as we move from causes to effects). Internal relations are found to be multiple and various and we find that their interconnection all points to a growing order of complexity if, through the mediation of our inquiry and additional acts of understanding, we can discover how many internal relations are all joined to each other through the mediation and the instrumentality of other internal relations that we might begin to understand without fully succeeding in adequately, fully understanding them. A trajectory, a hierarchy, an order presents itself to us as, gradually, we try to move toward some kind or some specification of an internal relation that would account for the being of all internal relations (all other internal relations), linking them all together in some kind of greater, encompassing whole in a way which would be explanatory for us as we try to deal with something that is unseen but which can be the term of an act of apprehensive understanding (however restricted, implicit, or indirect could be our various, human acts of understanding).

In Lonergan's analysis thus, as we find it in the context of his systematics in his theology of the Trinity, in speaking about accidents, Lonergan does not directly attend or begin with an act of direct understanding as this would exist in a way which would directly grasp what an accident is. Instead, in his theology of the Trinity (in its systematics), a definition is first given although, in his understanding of our human cognition and as we should be able to verify this understanding of his as we refer to the data and the acts of our own cognition, it is a conclusion and a principle with him that all of our concepts and definitions somehow derive from our initial, prior, direct acts of understanding. Our acts of conceptualization or definition come from our prior direct acts of understanding where, in the context of our understanding, an insight exists with a concreteness which is peculiar to it since, in fact, all of our direct acts of understanding exist as insights into something that, in its concreteness and specificity, is specific and particular in the manner of how it is first encountered by us through our prior acts of human sensing. A phantasm or image of some kind has somehow emerged as a suggestive clue or hint (a point of departure) and, in our apprehending understanding acts, a universal significance or a universal meaning is detached from a particular experience of data that has been given to us within parameters that are conditioned and which belong to conjugate determinations of space and time. In our later, consequent acts of conceptualization, a universal formal content is rejoined to matter (to the being of material conditions) through the agency of a universalized specification of matter which exists

as an apprehension of common matter and not as an apprehension of instances that belong to experiences of peculiar, particular matter. An intelligibility that is found and which is taken from the data of our sensing experience is joined and connected to all possible material instances of it, wherever (whether in this specification of matter or in this other specification of matter). This kind of material condition is always joined to this specification of meaning or this specification of intelligibility.

In conclusion then, citing Lonergan's own words, "if accidents are real, internal relations are real."¹² To know about accidents is to know about internal relations since, with every fuller understanding of accidents and within the context of this expanding understanding, we know about the being of substances and we can thus know more about the givenness of an internal relation which relevantly, pertinently exists. The internal relation becomes a kind of indemonstrable thing or an indemonstrable reality since, in our speaking about accidents (which supposes our having to speak about substances), we necessarily suppose the being of a constitutive, internal relation which exists in a way that cannot be known from a standpoint that could somehow exist apart from the being of the internal relation that we are attending to and, in some way, participating in, experiencing, and knowing: internal relations as these exist within metaphysical determinations of being and internal relations as these also exist within ourselves within cognitional determinations of being whenever we refer to our different acts of human cognition and how these relate to each other. The indemonstrability of but one species of internal relation (although not the irrationality of this one species of internal relation) points to the good and the reality of other similar, like indemonstratives (other indemonstrable inner relations) and the fact that they too cannot be argumentatively known in a probative fashion in a way which corresponds to the order of our human cognition as, allegedly, our acts move: through acts of inquiry, from acts of sensing toward acts of understanding that are geared toward the kind of completion which exists in our acts of reflective understanding). If, on the one hand, God's existence can be proved through the marshaling of our arguments and through experiences and apprehensions of evidence which point toward the truth of any conclusions that we would like to make, if it can be demonstrated from a vantage point which has not to assume or to suppose the truth or the reality of God's existence, on the other hand however, how God exists as an internal relation can only be approached if our point of departure is an apprehension of internal relations that can only be adequately known if we should admit to ourselves that they cannot be proved. They cannot be demonstrated. They exist in their own right as indemonstratives and so, as indemonstratives, they condition us with respect to how things exist within our world and how our acts of cognition exist and relate to each other. So fundamental is the reality or the truth of their existence; hence, for this reason, so fundamental is the meaning and the likelihood of an inference, a conclusion, or a truth which comes to us and realizes that, in some way, an indemonstrable, internal relation exists within God as both a complex and simple unity that cannot exist apart from its own constitutive terms (though, hypothetically, we might not initially know what, possibly, these terms could be). Real distinctions exist between the terms or among the terms and, at the same time, a unity between the terms which is no less real, right, and true.

Something exists as a greater, more wonderful unity or something exists in its unity with a greater degree of fullness to the degree that an inner relation exists within it. The tighter the bond, the greater the unity. The absoluteness of the bond points to the absoluteness of the unity and we wonder if we can only speak about the absoluteness of any kind of proposed, known, existing unity if we can refer or if we must refer to the absoluteness of a constitutive inner relation which, in some way, must exist. No contradiction need exist between the simplicity of a thing's existence and a complexity which belongs to the reality of the same existence. Internal relations exist as a form or, better, as an act or agent of reconciliation and mediation. The more we know about different kinds of internal relations, the more

¹²Lonergan, *Triune God: Systematics*, p. 689.

that we can know about the unique kind of internal relation that is alone proper to God.