

***Gratia creata* [created grace] - A Philosophical Argument to Prove its Existence¹**

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1. Introduction

On October 31, 1999 -- which, for many Protestant churches, is the anniversary of Reformation Day -- on behalf of the various Protestant churches of the "Reformation" -- official representatives of the Lutheran World Federation joined with official representatives of the Catholic Church to sign a "Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification" (*JD*) since both churches wanted to show that they "are now able to articulate a common understanding of our justification by God's grace through faith in Christ" (*JD*, 5). With respect to the "meaning and the scope" of this common understanding, this document says that today "a consensus in basic truths of the doctrine of justification exists between Lutherans and Catholics" and "in the light of this consensus the remaining differences of language, theological elaboration, and emphasis in the understanding of justification are acceptable" (*JD*, 40).²

¹ Editorial note: This paper was originally written in German by Fr. Giovanni B. Sala, SJ under its original title: "Die »gratia creata« - ein philosophisches Argument zum Beweis ihrer Existenz." It first appeared in the following German periodical: the *Forum Katholische Theologie* 17. Jahrgang 2001, Heft 4. Where, in German, Fr. Sala cites texts which had been taken from Church documents of one kind or another, or where he translates into German texts which had been originally rendered in Latin, for the sake of ensuring accuracy, to avoid providing translations of translations, we have usually cited the English translations of texts that have appeared in English language Church documents. At times also, we have consulted English translations of texts that have been made by other persons (other authorities) and, if necessary, we have compared translations with each another to check for their accuracy. In the internet publication of this translation, in obtaining the permissions that were needed, special thanks is owed to Fr. Stefan Kiechle SJ, Fr. Ralf Klein SJ, and Dr. Ulrich L. Lehner. Any questions, reflections, or criticisms would be welcomed. Eds. Lonergan Institute for the "Good Under Construction"

² See *Die Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre. Alle offiziellen Dokumente von Lutherischem Weltbund und Vatikan*, 87/1999, ed. Lutheran Church Office, United Evangelical Lutheran Church of Germany (Hanover, 1999) [in English: *Joint Declaration of the Doctrine of Justification. The Lutheran World Federation and the Roman Catholic Church*, trans. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., The Lutheran World Federation, and The Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2000)]. In addition to the *Joint Declaration*, my paper is of direct relevance to two other texts: the "Antwort der Katholischen Kirche auf die Gemeinsame Erklärung zwischen der Katholischen Kirche und dem Lutherischen Weltbund über die Rechtfertigungslehre" [the *Response of the Catholic Church to the Joint Declaration of the Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation on the Doctrine of Justification*] issued on June 25, 1998 [erroneously dated as June 25, 1988 in the published German text]; and the "Gemeinsame Offizielle Feststellung des Lutherischen Weltbundes und der Katholischen Kirche" [the "Official Common Statement of the Lutheran World Federation and the Catholic Church"] with its "Annex," issued on November 6, 1999. These same documents, with the exception of the "Gemeinsamen Offiziellen Feststellung," [the "Official Common Position"] can also be found in *Einig im Verständnis der Rechtfertigungsbotschaft?* [An Agreement in our Understanding of the Message of

With these remarks, I do not intend to analyze in detail either the text of the *Joint Declaration* or any of the related official documents.³ Instead, I would like to focus on only one point which relates to the doctrine of justification as this doctrine is understood in the teachings and the theology of the Catholic Church. I refer here to what the Church teaches about the meaning and being of *gratia creata* [created grace] which, in its own way, exists as a part of what Church teaches about the meaning and being of *gratia Christi* [the grace of Christ]).⁴

In the *Joint Declaration*, created grace is not expressly talked about. One can only find a number of statements (largely derived from scripture) which can be possibly understood to have a meaning which,

Justification?) (The President of the German Bishops Conference, issue 19), reprinted on September 21, 1998.

3 For detailed analyses of these texts, please see the excellent analysis of Leo Scheffczyk: „Die 'Gemeinsame Erklärung' zur Rechtfertigungslehre und die Norm des Glaubens“ [“The 'Joint Declaration' on Justification and the Norm of Faith”], *Theologisches*, 28 (1988) 61-68, 125-132; „Einig im Uneins-Sein. Zu den Konsensdokumenten in der Rechtfertigungslehre“ [“To be United in Disunity. On the Consensus Documents with respect to the Doctrine of Justification”], *ibid* 29 (1999) 453-648; „Der ökumenische Dialog und das bleibende Katholische“ [Ecumenical Dialogue and the Abiding Catholic], *ibid* 30 (2000) 218-230; "'Differenzierter Konsens' und 'Einheit in der Wahrheit'. Zum ersten Jahrestag der Unterzeichnung der Gemeinsamen Offiziellen Feststellung zur Rechtfertigungslehre“ [“'Differentiated Consensus' and 'Unity in Truth'. The First Anniversary of the Official Common Position on the Doctrine on Justification”], *ibid*, 437-146; „Ökumene auf dem Weg: Gemeinsamkeit bei verbleibenden Verschiedenheiten in der Rechtfertigungslehre. Die 'Gemeinsame Erklärung' und die vatikanische 'Präzisierung“ [“Ecumenism on the Way: Common Ground amid Remaining Differences with respect to the Doctrine of Justification. The 'Joint Declaration' and the Vatican's 'Clarification’”], *FKTh* 14 (1998) 213-220. Scheffczyk notes, with respect to the methodological procedures that were used, that consensus was achieved by providing statements which were deemed by its authors to refer to „basic truths“ which are to be distinguished from „differing explications“ (*JD* 14), „differing explications“ interpreting these „basic truths.“ A consensus exists when we refer to "abstract formulas" for the simple reason that these formulas are expressed in concepts which do not differ from each other as concepts (for example: we can refer to faith, grace, sin, freedom, and cooperation) although these concepts have meanings that are fixed by theological doctrines which, in turn, belong to „differing explications." Consequently, the common formulas that are used by the two opposing parties are "each satisfied by a different content" (*Theologisches*, 1998, 66). Editorial note: In the context of the English speaking world, for a study which resembles the kind of analysis which is found in the work of Leo Scheffczyk, see Christopher J. Malloy, *Engrafted into Christ: A Critique of the Joint Declaration* (New York: Peter Lang, 2005).

4 Editorial note: Please distinguish between official Church teaching which speaks about the reality of “created grace” and the absence or use of terminology which employs a conceptuality which explicitly speaks about “created grace.” The wording of official Church documents fails to speak about "created grace" although, in Aquinas, we find numerous references to created grace (a grace which is other than uncreated grace and which exists as a “created communication” of the divine nature which only belongs to God): a grace, thus, which is “absolutely supernatural” because it exceeds “the proportion not only of human nature but also of any finite substance.” Cf. Bernard Lonergan, *Early Latin Theology*, trans. Michael G. Shields, eds. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), p. 79; J. Michael Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-*

from a Catholic perspective, would refer to the presence of created grace. Hence, for example, when speaking about God's justification of human beings, it is said that God "imparts the gift of new life in Christ" (*JD*, 22). In this act of God, we have "a new creation" (*JD*, 26) ["God's act is a new creation"]. It is no wonder thus that, in the *Response of the Catholic Church to the Joint Declaration of the Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation on the Doctrine of Justification*, with respect to the section of the *Joint Declaration* about the "The Justified as Sinner" (4.4), it is noted that what is said about the "renewal and sanctification of the inner man" is contrary to what is said by the Council of Trent in its *Decree of Justification* (DS 1528) ["justification...is not only the remission of sins but also the sanctification and the renewal of the interior person..."].

Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), p. 49; <http://forums.catholic.com/showthread.php?p=5800944> (accessed October 14, 2013). This created, communicated nature cannot be identified with God's own nature (the kind of infinite nature which only God possesses) and, in turn, it cannot be identified with a finite nature that typically belong to creatures (a nature which cannot explain how a creature can attain God *as God exists in himself* by operations which belong to the subjectivity of a given creature: what a creature is able to do and what a creature is able to receive). Hence, for an adequate explanation, we must speak about the addition of a new *immanent* principle which God creates and which he bestows on us as human beings, a nature which is contingent and finite but which also exists as a grace which adds to what is given to us in nature because it explains why we can now share in the reality of God's infinite nature, participating in it to some extent (in however limited a way). Citing Stebbins on the effect of created grace when it is bestowed and received by us as human beings (p. 50):

The created communication of the divine nature does not produce absolutely supernatural acts in us but rather makes us the kind of person in whom the occurrence of such acts is fitting, proper, and even, as it were, second nature.

With respect thus to the Church's official teaching and the commonly rendered wording of this teaching, it is said, for instance, about sanctifying grace that it is a "supernatural gift" and that it is "really distinct from God." Cf. Ludwig Ott, *Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma*, ed. James Canon Bastible, trans. Patrick Lynch (Rockford, Illinois: Tan Books and Publishers, Inc., 1974), p. 254. We refer here, allegedly, to a doctrine or a teaching which is "proximate to Faith." It is "regarded by theologians generally as a truth of Revelation" although it "has not yet been finally promulgated by the Church." Cf. Ott, p. 9. In contrast, Peter Lombard, in his *Sentences* 1, d. 17, had spoken about "the grace by which we are justified" as an uncreated grace. It is "the uncreated Holy Ghost Himself, Who dwells in the souls of the just, and immediately, of Himself...effects the acts of love of God and love of one's neighbor." But, on the other hand, the Council of Trent speaks about sanctifying grace as "God's justice, not by means of which He is Himself just, but by which He makes us just." Cf. Ott, 254. Citing the pertinent text which is taken from chapter 7 of the *Decree of Justification* (1547) [cf. *The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church*, 6th ed., ed. Jacques Dupuis (New York: Alba House, 1996), p. 752, #1932]:

Finally, the single formal cause is "the justice of God, not that by which he is himself just, but that by which he makes us just," namely the justice which we have as a gift from him and by which we are

In the following text, I will present an argument which will prove that it is not possible to claim, as true, that God justifies a man, that he gives him his Holy Spirit, and that he, man, has assumed the place of a child - or whatever one of these complex events you would want to use and describe as characterizing what happens in justification - without at the same time acknowledging the presence of a corresponding contingent, created reality – we refer to the presence of *gratia creata* [created grace] - which affects the justified man. This is the main purpose of my project in the context of this paper.

The argument which I use I take from the writings of Bernard Lonergan, SJ. I refer here to a philosophical argument that Lonergan first formulated in his doctoral dissertation on the theology of "St. Thomas' Thought on *Gratia Operans*" which was published in the journal *Theological Studies*

spiritually renewed. Thus, not only are we considered just, but we are truly called just and we are just, each one receiving within oneself one's own justice, according to the measure which "the Holy Spirit apportions to each one individually as he wills" [1 *Cor* 12:11], and according to each one's personal disposition and cooperation.

Instead of an identity that would exist between the grace of justification and sanctification and the person of the Holy Spirit, a real distinction is adverted to in a manner which points to how we can distinguish a gift from a giver, a gift of grace from the person of the Holy Spirit. In the teaching of Trent, a real distinction is drawn which comes to us originally from St. Augustine who had spoken about the justice of God in words that were later quoted by the Council of Trent (cf. *In Iohannis evangelium, tractatus* 26.1, in *Corpus Christianorum*, La, vol. 36, p. 260, as translated and cited by Malloy, p. 25, n. 17):

The justice of God is here said not of the justice by which God is just but of that which God gives to man so that man might be just through God.

As Augustine reiterates in one of his sermons [cf. *Sermo* CXXXI, chap. 9; PL 38, col. 733]: "The justice of God is said to be not that by which the Lord is just but that by which he justifies those whom he makes just from being sinners" (as cited by Malloy, p. 26, n. 22). When, in the context of the Council of Trent, the grace of justification is referred to as a "formal cause," what we have in this terminology is a transposition of meaning since the same meaning is now being rendered within a changed context (within a context which refers to a different way of thinking and a different way of speaking: hence, a different conceptuality). What Augustine had taught in the context of his day and time is presented in a manner which works with another set of principles (a first set of explanatory principles if we should want to claim that, in the context of Augustine's theology, an explanatory understanding of justification is but a potency that awaits a later kind of realization). Hence, centuries later, in the articulate teaching of the Council of Trent, an understanding of justification is given in a manner which refers to a limited set of causes that are all derived from the philosophical analyses of Aristotle's metaphysics where he explains why, in understanding anything which belongs to our physical natural world, we should refer to a set of four distinct causes which should all be invoked if we are to move toward explanations which would allegedly be adequate (as a consequence of their comprehensiveness), the existence of one kind of cause suggesting the existence and validity of the other kinds of cause. However, when, from our knowledge of naturally existing things, we borrow and adapt categories that we turn and apply toward a possible knowledge and understanding of

1941-42, and then later appeared as a book, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, London, 1971, Toronto 2000 (the latter edition is Volume 1 of the *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* which have been appearing since 1988, published by the University of Toronto Press). A German edition of *Gnade und Freiheit* (Salzburger Theologische Studien, 8), Innsbruck: Tyrolia, to which I shall refer, appeared in 1998. In the academic year 1946-47, in Montreal, Lonergan gave a lecture on the *Gratia Christi* [the grace of Christ] and he prepared lectures notes for his listeners, *De ente supernaturali supplementum schematicum*, in which he set out the systematic part which belongs to the theology of grace. In it, he also takes up problems and issues which are of concern to us as these directly refer to arguments which are given about God's actions *ad extra* [to the outside], albeit, in connection with questions which ask about the meaning and presence of *concursum divinum* [in English, "divine concurrence" or "divine concourse," if one prefers to use a literal translation].⁵ The reason for this is perhaps given when we realize that, at that time, Lonergan was not grappling with the teaching of Protestant theology and so he had no reason or need to prove the existence of received doctrine (*doctrina recepta*) as this refers to the existence of created grace. In the argument which Lonergan makes, he repeatedly takes up his argument in various treatises which he published during his teaching career spent at the Gregorian University in Rome: the *De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica supplementum* [The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ], 1958, 49-56;⁶ the *De Deo Trino* [The Triune God]. II *Pars Systematica* [Systematics], 1964 (in the chapter, *De divinis missionibus* [The Divine Missions]); and the *De Verbo Incarnato*,⁷ 1964 (in theses 7 and 9 about the hypostatic union).

Any argument then which attempts to prove the existence of created grace belongs to a question which asks about the works of God *ad extra* which, in turn, is a question which then belongs to a larger, broader question which asks then about what kind of reality belongs to any true statements that we would make about God - whether these statements are known by reason or by revelation. Since God

supernaturally existing things, we move into a species of inquiry which works with analogies and which looks for intelligibilities that are defined by analogical acts of understanding.

5 Editorial note: See J. Michael Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) where the expression "divine concourse" is frequently used and the Latin *concursum* is never used. According to editorial note j which is given in Bernard Lonergan's *Collection*, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), p. 266, Lonergan "regularly" avoided providing an English translation for the Latin term *concursum*. Similarly, Sala avoids using a German translation. The explanation which is proffered notes that Lonergan prefers to use the Latin and not to provide an English translation for *concursum* because, in English, "concurring" or concurrence usually refers to an "agreement of minds" which can exist among different persons. However, in the context of his thought and analysis, Lonergan wants to speak about what exists or what we have where the intended object of what is meant is that which exists as a "metaphysical cooperation in actions."

6 Editorial note: In his paper, Sala refers to the Latin texts of the *De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica supplementum*, the *De Deo Trino*, and the *De Verbo Incarnato*. With the exception of the *De Verbo Incarnato*, to date the other two works have been translated into English (English on one side and Latin on the other) and published by the University of Toronto Press. *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ* appeared in 2002 and *The Triune God: Systematics*, in 2007.

7 For the following remarks, I refer primarily to the *De constitutione Christi*, 49-53.

subsists in three persons, in what now follows, I will need also to refer to some issues in the context of Trinitarian theology, discussing these issues to the extent that it is necessary to do this in order to move toward an understanding of certain truths about God.

With respect then to the proof that we must acknowledge if we are to know about the existence of created grace, if you believe in the blessedness of man as this comes to us a consequence of divine revelation, on this basis or granting this basis, I will then add some reflections which will refer to how this grace was understood within the tradition of the Church and how, in our day, it can be understood within our current cultural context. I refer here to a species of theological understanding which pertains to what we already know about through what is given to us in our faith. Some reflections about the rational means which I am using will connect to this theological understanding in a manner that theology needs if, in theology, we are to develop in the understanding of our faith. Indeed, in the course of my reflections I will repeatedly examine the philosophical assumptions that are implied in the theological teaching which I am presenting.

2. Four Classes of Statements about God

With respect to God whom we can know through our human reason and God that we can also consider as being the Trinitarian God of revelation, the truths that we can say about him are divided on the basis of four criteria. These criteria arise from two different points of view: (1) from which subject the statements are made and (2) how what is said is related to the subject.

As regards the *subject*, it can deal with truths which are either (1) *common* or *jointly shared*, i.e., they are predicated of the three divine persons in the same identical way, e.g., the Father, Son and Holy Spirit each exist as *ipsum esse subsistens* [each is subsisting being itself], each exists as infinite *intelligere* [understanding], and each exists as Creator of the universe, or (2) *individual* or *proper*, i.e., they are predicated solely for one or two of the divine persons, e.g., the Son is begotten of the Father; or the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit (*spirant*).

As regards *relations* or *connections* that are present, with respect to truths which are befittingly predicated of God, one can refer to truths which are either (3) *necessary*, e.g., God is eternal, God is infinite, and God subsists in three persons, or (4) *contingent*, i.e., truths which could have been different from what they were, e.g., God has created the world and he maintains its existence and God the Son became man.

When we turn to truth and the meaning of truth, truth refers to a conformity or a concordance which exists between a judgment which is made by us and the reality which is intended by a judgment: an *adaequatio intellectus et rei* [literally, adequation of intellect and thing].⁸ This, in turn, raises the question which asks about what kind of reality or what realities exist in or outside of God which will conform to what has been stated thus far so that the conformity between statement and reality takes

⁸ Editorial note: See editorial footnote 10 below which attempts to explain what is meant by a relation of adequation that would exist here between an intellect and a thing (in other words: what would exist, on the one hand, as a knowing intellect and what, on the other hand, would exist as a thing that is understood and known by this same intellect). Our understanding of the nature of this relation will vary according to the kinds of questions which we will ask and the point of departure which we accept or use if we are to frame the questions that we will pose, the kind of question which we are asking determining the kind of answer that we will move towards.

place or is, in fact, achieved in a given judgment (a conformity which is essential for truth). If we divide our statements about God on the basis of the two elements which have been mentioned above (subject of the statement and how what is said is related to the subject), we obtain the following four classes of truths.

I. With respect to all of the divine persons, (1) *common* and (3) *necessary* truths which are expressed correspond to the divine essence. Hence, we say: a) the infinitely perfect essence of God is sufficient to establish his eternity, his immutability, his subsistence in three persons, etc; and b) common and necessary statements about God as he exists *in se* and *ratione* are identical with the essence of God. In other words, common and necessary statements about God can be traced back or they can be derived if we refer to the simple and infinite nature of God (God's simple and infinite essence).

II. With respect to each of the divine persons, (2) *proper* and (3) *necessary* truths which are expressed correspond to the subsisting relations which are identical with the divine essence and yet really distinct from one another so that they constitute the three divine persons who, as persons, are distinct from one another.⁹ Because the relations are as necessary as is the divine essence, we can say that what is said of them is also necessary. But, because the same relations are also really distinct from one another, these differences explain what is peculiar or characteristic of one or two persons. Thus, for example, the fact that the Son is begotten of God the Father is predicated of God the Father as a proper and necessary truth not insofar as he is God but insofar as he is the Father.

III. With respect to God, (1) common and (4) contingent truths add to the being of God (God's divine essence) only a *relatio rationis* [a relation of reason] and, outside of God, they refer to the existence of an appropriate created reality (a *terminus conveniens ad extra* [an appropriate extrinsic term]).¹⁰ A contingent truth which does not add any reality to God's essence is explained by the fact that, in God who exists as an absolutely simple and necessary essence, no contingent reality can possibly exist. That these truths deal with a contingent reality that is created by God outside of himself is explained by the fact that a contingent truth, as contingent, can only correspond with reality only through a contingent being which happens to exist. That in God himself a *relatio rationis* is conceived of in a manner which refers to the presence of a contingent reality is explained by the fact that, in order to predicate anything contingent of God, within our thinking, in some way, we need to relate God to a given reality which he has caused.

IV. With respect to a divine person (2) proper and (4) contingent truths which are predicated, these add to a subsisting relation (which is the divine person that is referred to) only a *relatio rationis*, a relation however which refers to an appropriate created reality which is given (an appropriate created reality which exists outside of God): a reality, however, which refers to the being of a subsistent divine relation in its own real way. Hence, for example, the truth of faith which refers to the Incarnation of the Son of God is a contingent truth. On the other hand, however, the second subsisting relation which exists in God (the filiation of God the Son) is not a reality which can be added to because, as a reality, it is as invariably and really identical with the divine essence as is the divine essence itself. However,

⁹ See the *Decree for the Copts*, Council of Florence (1442): *omnia (in Deo) sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositional* [everything (in them) are one where there is no opposition of relationship], DS 1330; see also Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1.

¹⁰ Editorial note: The Latin *conveniens* is often also translated as suitable or fitting. Lonergan usually translates *conveniens* according to what is fitting.

this revealed mystery of faith can thus be true (i.e., it corresponds to reality)¹¹ only through an appropriate created reality that is external to God and which, in a real way, refers to the second divine person.

The *terminus ad extra conveniens* [appropriate external term], which encompasses and entails all the contingent truths which can be said about God himself, is *simultaneously* (a) both a *relatio rationis* which is known with respect to God (where, in a relation, both terms are thought about at the same time) (b) and also a contingent truth that is predicated of God (since, in light of the correspondence which is constitutive of truth, contingent reality is something which must be). It must exist. However, in relation to divine being (or, with respect to truths that are properly predicated of a divine person,

11 Editorial note: When Sala speaks about correspondence, please note that the context refers to a philosophy of cognition which thinks about human knowing in terms of identity or conformity: an identity between what exists, for us, as a truth within the understanding of a human knower and any realities or beings which are other than the being or the existence of ourselves as human knowers. Truths exist as terms or as a consequence of our acts of judgment. A real, metaphysical distinction exists between the being of a knower and the separate being or the separate existence of any object which would be other than the being or the existence of a knower (the self-knowledge of a knower is the only exception). However, if we move from the order of being which exists within metaphysics toward the order of being which exists with respect to our human cognition, through acts of judgment which exist as reflective acts of understanding, we find that no real distinction exists between a truth that a given knower knows and something of being or reality which is known through the mediation of a truth which a given knower happens to know or which is given when an affirmative assent exists with a knowing subject. Within the context of this kind of knowing, we can speak about how, in our human knowing, experiences of self-transcendence exists within us as human beings since, as human subjects, within the order which is present within the structure and the order of our human cognition, we move from the mere givenness or presence of sense data toward experiences of understanding which are also present to us within our consciousness of self. These initial acts of understanding, in turn, elicit questions which ask about the possible reality or the possible truth of an idea that we have grasped through an act of direct understanding which has been already given to us. A prior act of direct understanding is to be clearly distinguished from a later act of reflective understanding. Knowing properly occurs within our judgments. “Knowledge...ends with judgment.” Cf. Aquinas, *In librum Boethii de Trinitate*, q. 6, a. 2.

A theory of truth which accordingly thinks in terms of correspondence and identity accordingly exists for us as an objectification or as a thematization of our cognitive experience which we can find when we turn to a philosophy which comes to us from origins that derive from the seminal influence of Empedocles and Aristotle. We think most especially about the achievements of Aristotle's analysis: how, in Aristotle's thought, we can have an understanding of identity as this exists within our cognition, an understanding which cannot be pictured or imagined, an understanding which does not exist as an act of sense. An identity first exists within our acts of sensing (*sensibile in actu est sensus in actu*; “the sensible in act is sense in act”) and then a second identity exists within our acts of direct understanding (*intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu*; “the intelligible in act is the intelligence in act”) and then, lastly, a third kind of identity exists between what is given to us in our affirmative judgments and what exists as an aspect or as an instance of real being. Through our knowing, through a form of immaterial assimilation which occurs through the intellectuality which exists in our acts of understanding, we are joined to a real order of things through a union which exists as a species of

truths which are properly predicated with respect to the presence of subsisting relations), when speaking about appropriate created realities, certain consequences naturally *follow* (we speak about *consequents*). God is absolutely independent. As infinite, he needs no creature as a prior condition nor as a concurrent contributing cause in order to create something (e.g. the world) or something human. In general terms: that which is contingently predicated of God in common or of one or two divine persons is, in that way, constituted by divine perfection itself and, so, from this, it follows as a requirement that we appropriately speak about a species of reality which exists outside of God (externally to God).

3. Statements about God are Statements about God Subsisting in Three Persons

communion. Whether we speak about being or whether we speak about reality (being and reality both refer to the same thing), each is as it is because each is defined by intelligibility. The reality of existing things is something which can only be understood (i.e., it is approached through the experience that we have of intelligibility). Reality is never seen. It is never espied. Identities exist within the fabric of our cognitive awareness (within our acts of sensing, understanding, and judging) and when we speak about the nature of these identities or how, in our cognitive awareness, we can experience these differing identities, we need to speak in a manner which does not suggest or suppose that a primordial kind of gap always exists between our subjectivity and what exists as objectivity: a separation or a lack of connection which typically, necessarily, or normally exists and which, in some way, we must bridge or cross if we are to move from subjectivity to objectivity (from the realm of our private being and our personal experience toward a realm of public being which is meant or which is intended whenever we speak about objectivity as a world which transcends that which we have in our personal being and existence). In this context, a self-enclosed notion of the human subject is employed as a first principle for understanding what can be said about the nature of our human cognition and, within the parameters of this viewpoint, nothing can be said about a contrary first principle which attends to the experience of self-transcendence which exists within our human cognition (or, in other words, the self-transcendence of our human subjectivity). We refer here to a point of view which supposes that, as human beings, we are always already joined to objectivity (a world of real objects). In various ways or, according to different degrees, we already subjectively participate in it, depending on the experiences which we are having as subjects or on the experiences which are given to us as human subjects. Already, through our desires for understanding and some kind of union with being, we are joined or we are turned toward a world which transcends the being of our individual private existence. Then, later on, through our subsequent acts of questioning and our later acts of understanding, we can be more fully joined to the being of this greater world. If we attend to where our desires for self-transcendence exist within ourselves (if we attend to where we can find these desires within our subjectivity), from there, we can begin to realize that we naturally and normally move toward objectivity through the apparatus or the condition of our subjectivity. Subjectivity does not exist in itself as some kind of impediment or block. It only exists as an obstruction if, oddly enough, it is not fully lived (if it is not entirely actual) or, in other words, if it is turned in on itself or if it exists in a self-enclosed kind of way. As human beings, to some extent, we can choose to turn away from existing as one kind of subject and so begin to exist as another kind of subject.

The temptations which we have or which we experience and which suppose that subjectivity and objectivity are juxtaposed in some way (opposing each other or existing apart each other) accordingly explain why great care must be exercised if we should use a language which allegedly wants to talk about the presence of identity in cognition but which instead speaks about the presence of

Among the truths which are *commonly* predicated of the divine persons, a question arises which asks about what exactly is meant when we try to understand how God exists as a person. Human reason is, in principle, capable of discovering about God that God is the "one true and living God, ... a single, entirely simple and unchangeable spiritual substance" (DS 3001). Hence, it knows that God exists as a person because it knows about God that God exists as a *subsistens in natura intellectuali* [a subsistent in an intellectual nature]. However, because our reason acknowledges about God that he exists as a single infinite substance, our reason is able to know that he exists as a single person.

As a result of God's self-revelation who has made himself known to us as one being in three mutually distinct persons, we know that our natural concept of God is more imperfect as a concept (it exists also

a paired correspondence: a correspondence which implies that subjectivity exists on one side and objectivity, on the other side. Cf. Joseph Fitzpatrick, *Philosophical Encounters: Lonergan and the Analytical Tradition* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), pp. 19-21. If we speak and think about the possibilities of correspondence, we can fall into a manner of picturing or imaging which implies or says that this is to be correlated with that. This goes with that or this is correlated with that. And when we begin to speak in this kind of way, we soon begin to give or to live within an interpretation which avoids speaking about how, in human cognition, identities exist between what exists within ourselves as knowers and something which is other than ourselves as knowers. An understanding of cognition which is initially grounded in the principle of identity soon receives another interpretation which takes its manner of speaking from a naïve understanding of human cognition: an empiricist understanding of cognition which supposes about juxtapositions that they resemble what we have when we refer to our acts of sense and the extroversion of human consciousness which exists within our acts of sense. Something exists outside of ourselves (something exists that is beyond ourselves) since, obviously, our acts of sense are caused by external sources or external points of origin which act from without, imposing themselves upon us in the consciousness of self which we have as human subjects. And so, within this context, when we try to think about how a cognitional act is paired with an object which is appropriate to it, we easily form a picture which takes us away from a way of thinking and understanding that directly refers the presence of identities which exist within our acts of cognition: act and object of act existing together in a unity or an identity which, yes, we can experience within ourselves (the experience refers to the data of our consciousness) but which we can never see from a third point of view which would want to refer to an act of sense that, perhaps now, we would like to have.

Aside then from an understanding of human cognition which speaks about a form of cognitive identity which joins a would be knower with an existing objective world of being, please also note that this understanding about the nature of human cognition is rejected by persons who hold to three contrary points of view:

- (1) A coherence theory of truth comes to us from the philosophies of Spinoza, Kant, and Fichte although origins can be traced to an interpretation of Aristotle which comes to us from the philosophy of Duns Scotus. It is said there that concepts are known independently of any relations which allegedly exist between concepts and, if we adhere to this point of view, we can say that relations between terms are discovered through a syllogistic form of human reasoning that compares one concept with another. If then, between two or more propositions containing concepts, we find a meaning or a concept which

as only an analogue!) which we are able to form on the basis of our faith. For this reason, we have a theological definition of person as a *subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali* [a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature], where *distinctum* [distinct] has been added because of our faith in the mystery of the Trinity. From this, it follows thus:

- 1) with respect to *necessary* as well as *contingent* truths that our human reason knows about God – for example, "God is omnipotent" (a necessary truth) or "God has created the world" (a contingent truth) --, in the light of faith we can say (it can be said) that these truths are all *common*, i.e., they can be said of all three divine persons and of each individual about himself.

is common to all these propositions, we can then say that, in this meaning, we apprehend a truth. Absences of contradiction point to the presence of a truth.

(2) A pragmatic theory of truth comes to us from a school of thought which has Scottish roots (the philosophy of Thomas Reid), a school of thought which is known to us as American pragmatism, its prominent thinkers being Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. In the context of this tradition, it is believed that if something works, it is to be regarded as true. If, in a given situation, a desired result is achieved, the preceding thinking and the understanding which have led to it are to be regarded as true. No real distinction exists between truths which have been tested and verified and truths which have not been tested and verified but which exist for us in an economic way as "working fictions" that successfully lead us toward results which we have been desiring and which we have especially wanted.

(3) A solipsist or willful theory of truth most recently comes to us from newer trends in contemporary philosophy which claim to be post-modern. Within this context, truth exists entirely as a function of our individual desires and interests. Each of us has truths of our own and no one person can challenge another with respect to the reality or the validity of a truth which a given person holds and propagates, employing means which allegedly refer to principles and criteria for judgment which exist invariantly across differences of time and history as, in any given situation, we move from one person to another or as we move from one culture to another. The principle of contradiction is, for instance, not to be regarded as a basic law of human reason. It does not exist, in some way, in all human minds and it cannot be used as a check for evaluating the truth claims which others might make in the context of their individual statements.

Summing up, these four theories of truth all accordingly exist as different points of view which, in some way, we would like to understand if we are to reach a judgment or an evaluation which can speak about the truth which exists when we attend to these different theories about the nature and the presence of truth. In our inquiry, we necessarily work with an understanding which is grounded in our self-understanding since, in order to understand the kind of truths which we can know about in the context of our cognition, our point of departure must be the kind of being which we happen to be as human beings, living as human subjects. Who and what we are determines what we can know and

- 2) the same conclusion applies to the *contingent* truths that, on account of revelation, we *commonly* predicate of God, for example with respect to God: "it has pleased His wisdom and goodness to reveal Himself and the eternal decrees of His will to the human race in another and supernatural way" (DS 3004).¹² These contingent truths are predicated of each divine person.
- 3) with respect to truths which are both *necessary* and *proper* (i.e., truths which are predicated of one or two divine persons), these all belong to the truths of faith that we only know by faith if we are to know about the existence of three persons in God. Thus, the *attributa propria* [proper attributes] are necessarily predicated of the persons. These attributes arise from the relations by which each person is constituted as an individual. Hence, for example, we point to the names of the individual persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. We also note that *ingenitus* [unbegotten] is said the father; and *Spirator* is said of the Holy Spirit as coming from both Father and Son, acting as one principle for the proceeding of the Holy Spirit.¹³
- 4) the divine missions contingently exist and they are properly predicated of the individual persons. Hence, as the Father has sent the Son visibly into the world as its Savior, so the Holy Spirit has been sent invisibly from the Father and the Son is sent for the sake of our

understand. Differences in being determine differences in knowing. In his own language, Aquinas had spoken about a due proportion or a *proportio* that exists between the mode of a subject's being and the mode of a subject's knowing. Cf. *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 12, a. 4; q. 12, a. 11. By directly referring to the data of our self-experience and the primacy of this experience, we can move toward a self-understanding which, in turn, indicates the kind of truth which properly belongs to us as human subjects (the kind of truth which we can have as human subjects). A rightly known theory of truth is correctly known if it emerges from how we attend to our acts of cognition exist as we experience them within the context of our self-consciousness. In our introspection and retrospection, we notice how one kind of act differs from another kind of act and what each is able to do and not do. One kind of act makes up for what another kind is not able to do in the context of an interactive form of determination which points to the presence of a necessary complementary which exists within the order of our human cognition (given the nature or any reasons which can possibly explain why our human cognition exists in the way that it happens to be). If we find that, between sense and intellect (our acts of sensing and our acts of understanding), a kind of mutual causation exists with respect to how these different acts all relate to each other (one kind of act informing or adding to another act while eliciting the being of this other kind of act), then, on this basis, we should be able to understand why, in the existence of truths that are known, identities of one kind or another are to be distinguished and known in terms which refer to what each happens to be and how one kind of identity prepares the way for other kinds of identity which are known by us within the context of our self-awareness. In the knowing which is proper to us as human subjects, the internal conditions which exist as acts and the external conditions which exist as objects exist together in a unity which is constituted by relations. The unity which exists is not derived from the unity of a single act.

12 Editorial note: The original Latin which is taken from the dogmatic constitution, *Dei Filius* on the Catholic Faith, chapter II: On revelation, reads as follows: *attamen placuisse ejus sapientiae et bonitati, alia, eaque supernaturali via se ipsum ac aeterna voluntatis suae decreta humano generi revelare*. Cf. <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/creeds2.v.ii.i.html> (accessed August 14, 2013). When Sala quotes from the German translation which we find in the German Denzinger edition, he omits "seiner Weisheit und Güte" ("his wisdom and goodness").

13 See Lonergan, *De Deo Trino*, II, 174-179.

sanctification as human beings. These *missiones* [missions] are to be spoken about later precisely because, when we speak about the mission of the Holy Spirit, we must speak about the reality of created grace (the mission of the Holy Spirit being intimately connected to the reality of created grace).

That something is predicated in common as regards the three divine persons of the Trinity or that something is predicated properly of two persons does not mean that these predicates should be indiscriminately applied in a manner which leads to confusion (*confuse*). For, what is attributed to God is attributed to the individual persons according to the way that they each have their divine nature. We note here thus that the Son has his being from the Father and the Holy Spirit, from the Father and the Son. According to the order in which the divine persons have the same essence as this refers to their divine nature, in the same order, there is attributed to them what they have in common. Specifically, what is said in common and contingently about the three divine persons as knowing, willing, and causing is constituted by the perfection that all three persons commonly participate in. These activities exist as one single principle (as *principium quo und quod* [as a principle by which an agent acts and also as a principle which acts as an agent]) although these acts are attributed to each person in a manner which differs from person to person,¹⁴ i.e., according to how these persons differ from each other. According to what has been said, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit exist together as one principle, accounting for the existence of all created beings.

4. Toward an Analogical Understanding about the Truths of God

Before we deal with our understanding of the truths about God that are both revealed and contingent at the same time – which includes the truth of justification and blessedness which needs to be investigated – we should attend to a question which asks about how we can arrive at all at any understanding about the truths of God. In our natural knowledge of God, a question which asks how we can *understand* the reality of God is an aspect which belongs to a larger question which asks about how we can *know* reality at all. We know the answer to the last question: the way which leads us toward a knowledge of transcendent reality (a reality which exists beyond our knowledge of proportionate reality) is based on a knowledge of proportionate reality. This reality refers to that which we can know about either through our external (sensory) experience, or through our inner experience (our consciousness) which is co-constitutive of all our psychic acts.

However, by definition, we say (we must admit) that transcendent reality is not directly given to us through what we have in experience. Hence, we are able to move toward a knowledge of absolutely transcendent reality – we move toward a knowledge of God - only if we begin from the knowledge which we have of our existing world. This is the familiar path of analogy. Our understanding of worldly things and the understanding which we have of ourselves enables us to form an analogical notion about what we could be asking about as a species of final or last cause: a final or last cause which refers to the final or last cause of the world. We have formed a notion or a concept of God so that, through our thinking, we can proceed from the known existence of the world to a judgment which asserts that “God exists.” This path which we follow finds its classic formulation in the *quinque viae* [the five ways] of St. Thomas Aquinas.¹⁵ Therefore, in our natural knowledge of transcendence, the

¹⁴ See Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 41, a. 5.

¹⁵ The five ways of Aquinas proceed from as many aspects of the intelligible world that Aquinas is able to conceive and they all ascend to their respective final declarations. Apart from the *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 2, a. 3, I respectfully refer to two major texts: the *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q.

reality which is proportionate to us fulfills a double function. First, the intelligibility of proportionate being allows us to understand transcendent reality in a manner which works with analogies; secondly, the existence of this world (the world of proportionate being) allows us to know about the existence of this transcendent reality.¹⁶

With respect to the “mysteries hidden in God,” however, “which can never be known unless they are revealed by God” (DS 3015), this is the way by which we *know* about the existence of these mysteries although this approach is other than the way by which we can *understand* these same mysteries. The first way is the way of faith; the second, the way of analogy (working with our analogical understanding). In this essay, in an enterprising manner, I attempt to clarify how *gratia creata* is to be

3, a. 4, ad 2 and the *Summa Contra Gentiles* 1, 2, 78 (Marietti edition) where, within these texts, Aquinas speaks unequivocally about the fact that we all come to know about the real being of things through the intentional being of judgment.

16 Editorial note: In the context of this discussion, questions can be asked about what exactly Sala is talking about. What is he referring to? On the one hand, it is commonly taught and believed that the truth of God's existence is something which can be known apart from what is given to us in the teachings of revelation. God's being or God's existence does not exist *per se* as a mystery of faith. In the context of Sala's discussion, because, as a general principle in theology, the object of our theological inquiry is the being of God and all things as they are related to God, it follows, from this, that our theological acts of understanding are to be viewed primarily as analogical acts of understanding. A direct understanding and knowledge of divine things is not given to us in the context of our present life. But, from what we directly understand and know about ourselves as human beings and about the being of our world, we can move toward a very partial and limited knowledge of God, and this knowledge of God is of very great value to us as human beings. An analogical understanding and knowledge of divine things transcends the absence of any kind of understanding and knowledge. No adequate comparison can be made between what exists and what does not exist. However, on the other hand, as we attend to the kind of understanding that is normally operative in the practice of inquiry in theology, it should be admitted that the asking of theological questions differs from the posing of philosophical questions. Philosophic arguments can be mounted to conclude that, yes, God exists. God must exist as the first cause of all existing things. No contingent thing is able to account for the being of its own existence. If we attend to the principle of sufficient reason and the demands of intelligibility that are given to us through the meaning of this principle, then, we must conclude, on philosophic grounds, that God's existence is to be admitted. Some kind of non-contingent being exists and this non-contingent, necessarily existing being is that which we commonly refer to as God. From this point on thus, if we should want to know more about the kind of being that God is, we must turn to the beliefs of religion, the truths of revelation, and analogical acts of understanding which exist within the work and practice of our theological activity. Analogical acts of understanding differ from proper acts of understanding as these acts exist within the practice of philosophy, acts of understanding responding to the posing of our philosophical questions. However, although we make this admission and although we admit that this distinction is well known and is honored by time, it is not to be denied too that, when we want to speak about the being of God's existence (the fact of God's existence), analogical acts of understanding are not to be regarded as wholly lacking in the usefulness and propriety which is proper to them. From truths that are known within a philosophic context (truths that are derived from our direct acts of understanding), more can be said about the being or the truth of God's existence if analogical acts of understanding can be added to reasons and the acts of understanding which we have had in the philosophic judgments which we have already made,

understood and so my efforts are to be placed within a context which is shaped by questions which ask about the understanding of our faith.

A well-known passage from *Dei Filius*, the Dogmatic Constitution of the First Vatican Council on the Catholic Faith, points in the direction of the second path which is mentioned above. In this text, a reason is given about why we should look for *aliquam...mysteriorum intelligentiam* (some understanding of the mysteries of faith). As a way toward this goal, the Council first speaks about an intelligibility that works with the "analogy of those things which it [the reason] naturally knows" and then an intelligibility that comes from these mysteries in terms of how they connect with each other and with how they then relate to man's end in terms of the ultimate end or goal which, as human beings, we normally and typically have.¹⁷

At this point now, we should become aware of a deficiency which we can find in the bilingual edition of "Denzinger" (edited by Peter Hünermann). The aforementioned quoted statement is rendered in words which speak about *eine gewisse Erkenntnis*¹⁸ *der Geheimnisse* [a certain knowledge of the mysteries]. However, despite the massive influence of a conceptualist way of thinking which was centuries old, the Council fathers deliberately connected with the word and meaning of *intelligentia* which had established itself in a tradition which has come down to us from Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas.¹⁹ In the wake of Isaiah 7.9, *Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis* [if you do not believe, you will

affirming the truth or the reality of God's existence. Within a philosophic context (a context which can be said to exist within a theological context which is the larger context of Sala's analysis), Sala adds analogical acts of understanding which can assist our acts of direct understanding since it is always possible for us that our analogical acts of understanding will lead us to new questions and, from the posing of new questions, new proper acts of understanding as these can exist for us within our practice of philosophy. In Sala's manner of argument, direct acts of understanding are combined with analogical acts of understanding in a manner which points to a fructifying relation which exists between the claims of faith and reason. Each develops or exists more fully because of how each is joined or related to the other (how each receives from the other) although, admittedly, the nature or the intelligibility of this relation is a datum which, in this life, we do not fully understand.

17 We can possibly understand this text so that it acknowledges two paths to our possibly understanding the mysteries of faith: first, the true and proper way of analogy and, second, the intelligibility of supernatural truths insofar as this is constituted by an ordered whole which exists within the relations which join one truth with another. However, because apprehensions of intelligibility with respect to the individual truths of faith which constitute this wholeness are obtained along the first path (following the way of analogy), we can also speak about an analogy with respect to the intelligibility of the whole (all these truths and mysteries existing together) although, admittedly, at a higher level of meaning (one which is more comprehensive).

18 Editorial note: original emphasis by the author in italic but rendered here in bold.

19 See J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio* [New and the Most Extensive Collection of Sacred Councils], vol 50, 85 A. In the footnote, reference is made to Augustine, Vincent of Lérins, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas. Conceptualism presents itself in the foreground as a key concept since it largely ignores the act by which we consciously and intelligently form concepts and, within this context, abstraction is reduced and spoken about as if it exists as a purely metaphysical "mechanical" process. Within this tradition, we find Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Editorial note: To avoid any possible ambiguity, the reference to "Council fathers" refers to a judgment or a decision of the Church's Magisterium as this was given in the context of the First

not understand], St. Augustine had formulated an intention which he then followed in the context of his later reflections on the truths of faith: *Nos id quod credimus, nosse et intelligere cupimus* [that which we believe, we desire to know and understand].²⁰ Resorting to St. Augustine, in the first chapter of his *Proslogion*, St. Anselm initiated a program which marked the beginnings of scholasticism as a distinct species of inquiry: *Non enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam* [For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand]. This program was summarized in the following chapter by a short formula which spoke about *intellectus fidei* [an “understanding of faith”] which has come to be understood as stating the purpose or the formal object of theology, defining what theology is all about.

With regard to Aquinas, I refer to the place in the *Quodlibetum* IV, Article 18, where he distinguishes between two types of disputation: one which looks for a sure knowledge of revealed truths and thus the need for a recourse to *auctoritates* [authorities] of one kind or another; and the other which looks for an *intellectus veritatis* [an understanding of truth]. For the latter, the teacher must give reasons that are appropriate so that students can somehow understand (analogically!) what they already know to be true, based on what they have received through the revelation of faith. In fact, in Aquinas, understanding exists as *intelligere in sensibili* [literally: understanding in the sensible] (see *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 84, a. 7) which translates what Aristotle had said when, equivalently, he had spoken about understanding as *noein en tois phantasmatai* [the intellectual faculty understands forms in phantasms] (*De anima* III, 7: 431b 1).²¹ So central to the Thomist doctrine of human knowledge is the existence of this understanding as *intelligere in sensibili* that, as a result of it, Aquinas can additionally write about understanding: *...intelligere, quod est actus proprius eius* [the human soul], *perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et naturam* [literally: ...understanding, which is the proper act of the human soul, perfectly showing its power and nature] (*Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 88, a. 2 ad 3).

A theology which is conceived in terms which speak about an *intellectus fidei* [an understanding of the faith] presupposes a clear distinction which exists between knowing and understanding: knowing as principally a knowledge of reality²² versus understanding (*intelligere*, insight) which discovers intelligibilities within the content of our external or internal experience. The ontological significance of an intelligible being is only determined in judgment (if we can refer to the presence of a judgment).

The *aliqua intelligentia* [the “some understanding”] which the conciliar text of Vatican I mentions is the systematic understanding which the theologian is in search of and who already knows about the mysteries of faith on the basis of an initial knowledge which presupposes a commonsense understanding or a catechetical understanding of these same mysteries since, without these kinds of understanding, acts of faith would make no sense. In addition, a different consequence should follow

Vatican Council.

²⁰ *De libero arbitrio* [On the Free Choice of the Will], II, 2: *ML* 32, 1242f.

²¹ Editorial note: Sala's quotation of Aristotle is actually taken from the *De anima* III, 7: 431b 2.

²² Knowledge of reality exists in two different ways: either through the *est* [the “is”] of a judgment which completes the process of human cognition as this process moves from its ground in experience toward an initial act of insight or understanding which then leads to the formation of a concept and then, finally, a form of absolute reduction which returns to experience from ideas and concepts which have been first thought and conceived, or through the *est* of an act of faith which, cognitively, relies on the truthfulness of one or more witnesses. In both cases (!), we know about the reality of judgment although, in these respective cases, we get to sound judgments in different ways.

from the fact that, in principle, theologians who seek an *intellectus fidei* [an understanding of faith] do not operate at the level of judgment and, for this reason, they do not operate at a level which refers to a knowledge of reality. In other words, they presuppose a knowledge which belongs to supernatural reality and which is achieved through faith (through their acts of faith). As a consequence thus, the understanding of faith which theologians elaborate is something which, in itself, is neither true nor false. Admittedly, determinations of truth and falsehood normally only happen within judgment. Hence, in this case, determinations of truth and falsehood occur within judgments which precede theology (the activity or the work which properly belongs to theology). From an understanding of faith, we can only say that, in varying degrees, it can provide us with an understanding which jives with a given culture. Admittedly, yes, an understanding of faith can be referred to as false in the sense that, although it is not a judgment, it could be a meaning that logically would lead to a denial of some truth. On the other hand however, a specific theology cannot so easily claim that it is the only possible theology which can be developed. Because of the distinction which exists between judgment and understanding, in principle, with respect to revelation, different kinds of understanding are possible. However, this fact, in turn, does not exclude the fact or the judgment which realizes that some philosophical systems are not suited as a whole or that some philosophical doctrines are not suited or that they are less suited, as rational instruments, for the kind of reflection which should occur within the work of theology.

Thus, in the context of these reflections on theological understanding, we have distinguished between human knowing as it exists in a strict and proper sense and human knowing as it exists in a wider, broader sense. In the first sense, a tripartite structure presents itself: acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging. In another different sense, knowing occurs in each of these acts which the structure of our human cognition assembles into a set. Understanding the epistemological status of *intelligentia* about which the Vatican texts speak is essential for accurately understanding what the theologian does when he or she is in search of an *intellectus fidei* [an understanding of faith].

5. Contingent Truths about God and Corresponding Reality

To get closer to the problem of *gratia creata*, it is now necessary for us to attend to statements about God which are contingently predicated of God, examining the kind of role which they play. Justification and blessedness belong to the supernatural order of salvation by which, with respect to God, "it has pleased His wisdom and goodness to reveal Himself" (DS 3004) in order to enhance and to serve the increase of our human kind. Even the natural order of creation is something which exists as the result of God's "free volition" (DS 3002). As a result, insofar as our reason is able to know God's existence "from created things" (DS 3003),²³ our reason is already faced with contingent predications which exist about God: statements which deal with how God is related to the created world. Hence, we would want to consider some of these contingent truths in order to determine what, in reality, would correspond to the contents of these truths.

In posing this type of question thus, as ever with respect to our having a natural knowledge of God, we soon notice that we are beyond any kind of reality which is proportionate to our way of knowing. In our knowing, we find that we are already working with an analogous kind of knowledge. According to the teaching of the First Vatican Council, when we speak about the existence of a *mysteriorum*

²³ Editorial note: Sala's quotation from Vatican I, *Dei Filius*, is actually taken from DS 3004. See *The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church*, eds. J. Neurer, SJ and J. Dupuis, SJ (New York: Alba House, 1996), p. 43, #113 and cited also as 3004.

intelligentia [an “understanding of mysteries”], our natural analogical knowledge is to be viewed as a starting point for an analogous understanding of the mysteries of faith. However, with respect to all the truths which are naturally known about God, these belong to truths which are either necessary or contingent and, at the same time, we refer to truths which are *commonly* predicated of each of the three divine persons. As I have already noted, our human reason cannot by itself know about the existence of three consubstantial persons in God. It follows thus that, in dealing with the question of created grace (*gratia creata*), it is more advisable and more appropriate for us that we should work with naturally existing truths which make contingent statements about God, working with contingent predications and not with any other kind of predication.

Belonging to this kind of predication is the following statement: "God knows, wills, and causes this thing or this event to occur within the world." The existence of each thing and the occurrence of each event in the world both exist as contingent realities (what exists in a contingent way). Since truth exists whenever a conformity exists between a proposed statement and reality, a question arises which asks about what kind of reality must exist or, in other words, what kind of reality exists as the objective reference of a reality that is contingently predicated of God? The answer is as follows. The reality which is necessary if we are to speak about the presence of any truthful predication within this context is the reality of God's knowledge, willing, and doing: God's actions occur through his knowing and doing, and this knowledge and volition are, in turn, both identical with the being of God's essence; *and* the existence of an intentioned thing or an intended event.

However, with regard to God's knowing, God's willing, and God's doing, our true statement does not mean that a new adventitious reality would not exist within God if God, as first cause, would not have caused the said thing or event. Because, as *actus purus*, God entitatively remains the same whether or not he knows a contingent being, he also remains the same whether he wills and causes any given thing or whether he knows and intends that a given being should not exist and therefore not exist as an effect.²⁴ On the other hand, the statements: "God knows, wills, and causes that a thing exists" and "God

²⁴ Editorial note: As prime mover, it is as a motionless unmoved mover that God exercises his power and influence on everything else which exists (everything which is other than God's own being). Cf. Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, 1, 13, 3-7; *Sententia super Physicam*, 8, 9, 1037-1049; *Super Librum De causis*, prop. 18; *Compendium Theologiae*, cc. 3-4; *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 2, a. 3. We can understand how or why all created things totally depend on the unmoved, fully actual activity of God's causality if we distinguish between a commonsense understanding of motion and an explanatory understanding of motion which speaks about motion as something which occurs more in an object that is moved rather than in a mover who initiates any kind of motion or movement.

In our ordinary or commonsense understanding of things, a movement occurs as a mover initiates a movement in another which exists as an other. When we roll a ball, it is obvious to us that motion occurs in both the ball that is moved and in ourselves as we move ourselves in a transitive way to effect a change or a motion in a ball which now moves from a stationary position or from a trajectory that had been established by the action of an earlier, previous motion.

However, if we seek to explain the movement of a proximate agent who has initiated the movement of a given object, for an explanation of this change or movement, at some point, we must suppose or point to the act or the action of a first mover: an *unmoved mover*, who initiates movement or change in another without undergoing any kind of change or movement in itself in a shift which would

knows, wills, and causes that the same thing does not exist" cannot be both true. Now, if the truth of whichever of these two mutually exclusive statements is of no difference to God himself as he exists in himself, then, with respect to the existence of a new reality that is indicated by a statement which says that "God knows, wills, and does this particular thing," when we attend to the relation which exists between this statement and the being of reality, when, in this context, we attend to a conformity which is implied between the presence and being of this statement and the presence and being of reality, in this context we are concerned with issues which only refer to the real existence of an intended contingent thing or the real occurrence of an intended contingent event. In practice, this means thus that, for instance, we can speak truthfully about God in the following way: "God, as first cause, caused the Lisbon earthquake of 1755" but he caused this earthquake only because this earthquake - as a contingent event - has actually occurred.

From this it follows, with respect to our topic, that our thesis expresses a metaphysical principle: A *contingent* statement about God cannot be true if it *only* corresponds to the absolute reality of God. We can only speak about a true contingent proposition about God if we refer to the content of a statement which corresponds to the being of a contingent reality (a reality which exists either as a thing or as an event). Whatever the nature or the type of contingent reality - the *terminus ad extra conveniens*, i.e., a reality which exists beyond or outside the unchanging reality of God - its reality always depends on the content of the statement which is given.

more or transition from a condition of potential movement to a condition of actual movement. As Aquinas notes in his *Sententia super Physicam*, 3, 4, 303 and in the *Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae, q. 110, a. 2, the act of movement or motion exists in the moved. *Actus motus est in mobili*. Or, as Aquinas argues in the *Sententia Libri De anima*, 3, 2, 592; p. 184, "the act of an active mover comes to full existence in what is passive to it, not in the agent as such" and so we can begin to understand "why it is not necessary that every mover be itself moved." Cf. Lonergan, *Triune God: Systematics*, p. 545. Movement is performed in what is moved. It is not performed in what moves. And so, the reality of an effect is completely found within contingent reality and not within any kind of being that is entirely lacking in any kind of contingency.

Hence, as the principle of cause and effect is applied to the relation which obtains between contingent, conditioned beings and an unconditioned being who exists in an absolute and total way (God exists as unconditioned being), while in the relations which obtain among contingent beings, these beings influence each other through instrumental causes that share in the reality of a mover and in the reality of what is also moved (Aquinas, *Sententia super Physicam*, 8, 9, 1044), in the relation which exists between contingently existing being and necessarily existing being (in the relation which obtains between created beings and God who exists as uncreated being), instrumental causes cannot be postulated as intermediaries which must exist in some way. No principle of mediation can be satisfactorily identified within this context and so, as a consequence, this principle is replaced by a second principle which speaks about a relation of direct, total dependence. For their life and existence, created realities immediately and directly depend upon the life and the existence of an uncreated reality. A real relation of dependence exists with respect to how creatures relate to God even if God enjoys no real relation of dependence on creatures. God's relation to creatures belongs to another order of being. A conceptual order of relation (a relation of reason or *relatio rationes*) is distinguished as the kind of relation which we can speak about when we speak about how it can be said that God is related to all the effects which he produces.

The metaphysical principle which is set out here is clear for everyone who knows what a true statement means and that, as rational beings, we are able to discover certain truths about God. The analogical nature of our knowledge of God in no way affects the truth of this said principle but instead, in company with a “detour” or “circuitous route” that is used to arrive at this knowledge, it points to the limits of such a knowledge with respect to its content.

When we speak about contingent predications as these apply to God, by a technical designation, we refer to *praedicationes per denominationem extrinsecam*, i.e., predications by way of extrinsic [external] denomination.²⁵ Thomas speaks about this kind of statement when he discusses the predicaments of *actio* and *passio* in the context of his *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* (Book III, lecture 5, especially n. 322). The fundamental metaphysical principle when we speak about action in the sense of a *causa efficiens* [an efficient cause] is in terms of *causa ut causa non mutatur* [a cause as cause which is unchanged]. A form of causation²⁶ accordingly exists which is to be understood in the sense of a real relation of dependency of an effect upon its cause, *secundum quod denominatur causa agens ab effectu, est praedicamentum actionis* [insofar as the agent cause is denominated by the effect, there is the predicament of action]. For Aquinas, the denomination of a cause from its effect is primarily the third of three ways by which it is possible to speak about how predications exist.

What interests us here, however, is not the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of causation. It is to be noted only that, with respect to finite causes, Aquinas acknowledges the fact that a real distinction exists between *posse agere* [potential acting] and *actu agere* [actual acting] without there being the need to do away with a basic principle which says that the working of an effect does not include any change in a cause which exists as a cause. This is true because a) in the finite cause, the *potentia operandi* [potency of operating] is not the same as the *operatio* [operation, activity]; b) the fact that a cause exists in the world at a certain time and not earlier requires an *applicatio ad agendum* [an application for action]; and c) material things only act through contact; they cannot touch anything other without being themselves touched (cf. *ibid*, lecture 4: 301 f).

Predications which exist by way of an external determination²⁷ apply *a fortiori* to what we would say about the contingent knowledge, willing, and action of God. However, in this situation, no true determination can exist without the true existence or the actuality of an external determinator.

By way of summary, contingent truths about God can be described as follows: “God is entitatively just the same, whether he creates the world or not, whether he does or does not will to create, whether he knows the world or not, whether he knows that creatures exist or that they do not exist.”²⁸ For the whole

25 Editorial note: “External” is inserted within square brackets to indicate that sometimes this term is used to translate the Latin *extrinsecam*.

26 In the context of his physics, Aristotle adverts to the causality of a finite cause which exists as a material cause. However, the aforementioned metaphysical principle also applies *a fortiori* [all the more strongly] to the causality of an infinite cause.

27 Editorial note: It is to be admitted that Sala's *äußere Benennung* literally translates into English as “external designation.” However, since the context of his analysis is a tradition of thinking which thinks in terms of determinations and denominations, we refer here to an “external determination” instead of an “extrinsic denomination.” *Benennung* is translated as “determination” in the multiple instances of its use in this paragraph.

28 Editorial note: as Augustine argues in the *De Trinitate*, 5, 17 (as cited by Neil Ormerod, in “A trajectory from Augustine to Aquinas and Lonergan: Contingent predication and the Trinity,”

entitative difference lies, not in the immutable God, but in terms existing externally (*ad extra*). That being assumed, however, it is also the case that God knows through his act of knowing, wills through his act of willing, and creates, conserves, and governs through his omnipotence. No external term (no *terminus ad extra*) accounts for the fact that God creates, sustains, and governs. For it is not things that are the cause of divine knowing; divine knowing is the cause of things. The same goes for God's willing and doing."²⁹ Such a conclusion, however, presents a philosophical doctrine of God that, for us, is not very understandable although, as a theology, it is entirely reliable. Admittedly, yes, within this philosophical doctrine of God, we find paradoxes (although no contradictions). But, at the same time, when we think about this paradox, we find that it most conspicuously shows what an infinite principle is.

6. Justification is a Contingent Event

The doctrine of justification is based on truths of faith: the elevation of the creature which is man toward a "participation in the divine nature" (2 Peter 1:4), and the fall of Man which occurs through the original sin of our first parents whereby, as a consequence, as human beings, we have become "children of wrath" (Ephesians 2:3).

Australian Catholic University, unpublished paper, p. 5):

Thus when he is called something with reference to creation, while indeed he begins to be called it in time, we should understand that this does not involve anything happening to God's own substance, but only to the created thing to which the relationship predicated of him refers ... So it is clear that anything that can be said about God in time which was not said about him before is said by way of relationship, and not yet by way of a modification of God, as though something has modified him.

In his own way of thinking and understanding, Aquinas similarly speaks about the nature or the intelligibility of contingent predication as this applies of contingent truths which are said about God in the context of the *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 13, a. 7 and 3a, q. 2, a. 7. Citing from q. 2, a. 7 (Ormerod, p. 6):

Now, as was said above (q. 13, a. 7) every relation which we consider between God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is something created.

²⁹ Bernard Lonergan, *De Verbo Incarnato*, 252. In this precise sense, as we shall see later, created grace exists as a *conditio consequens ad extra* [consequential condition existing in an external way] of the contingent truth that, in justification, the Holy Spirit gives Himself to a human being.

Justification occurs when a person believes in the salvation of Jesus Christ and is baptized in his name. In its *Decree on Justification*, the Council of Trent speaks about a "transition from the state in which one is born a child of the first Adam, to the state of grace and 'adoption as children' (Rom 8:15) of God" (DS 1524). However, because the state of grace does not preclude a possible loss of the justification which has been bestowed on a person as a consequence of personal fault, the same Savior has "instituted the sacrament of penance for those who fall into sin after baptism" (DS 1542).³⁰

Justification is therefore an event which, at some point, happens in the life of an individual out of a freedom that inherently belongs to justification - however one might explain the free decision of a human being to receive God's prevenient gift. Admittedly, yes, justification can occur more than once (possibly occurring several times) even if, in each their own way, Catholic theology and Lutheran theology offer different explanations when attending to how, by his offenses, man can lose his justification³¹ and how, by which acts, justification can be regained.

The way and manner of justification on the part of God is differently expressed over time as we find it within the Scriptures, the proclamation of the Church, and the reflections of theologians. However, one thing should be clear with respect to the truth of these statements: the justifying work of God does not mean that, in God himself, there exists a new reality; a reality which could not have been present within God; and that the gift of justification is something that a given man could not have accepted and agreed to. On the other hand, it is also clear that the event of justification for the persons who are affected by it cannot be the same as a situation where, by our own fault, we can possibly reject "the adoption of sonship" (Galatians 4:5). Now, if justification is an event which is found in the here and now of our world and if it cannot exist alone within the eternal and the immutable being and action of God, justification requires, as a contingent reality, something else which is contingent: a something else that happens within us as human beings or a something else which exists within us as human persons. A third possibility cannot exist where, in this situation, we would be able to speak about the truth of contingent events without there also being something which exists as a contingent event.

In short: is there a real, objective difference when I say that God justifies this person and when I say that God does not justify this person?³² The answer is: Yes, but not in God. The real difference lies

30 Because the Council of Trent, in connection with the biblical and the dogmatic doctrine about the event of justification through baptism, at the same time, also invokes the possibility of our entirely losing any memory of God's gift to ourselves, this fact accordingly indicates how little the Council understood *gratia creata* as if it existed as some kind of "property" which is owned by us as human persons and which is easily available to us as an indispensable part of sanctification. However, it is to be noted that this idea of a property which belongs to human people as if it were their own is precisely one of the main reasons why Lutheran theology rejects the doctrine of *gratia creata*.

31 According to the Lutheran understanding of justification, the justified man loses God's justification that has been granted to him only by sinning against (fiduciary) faith.

32 Let us remember as follows: we ask questions about what "happens" when we refer to two mutually contradictory circumstances which exist with respect to God. Under the assumption that God calls all people to salvation and that he gives to them all the necessary help, we do not ask why a given person actually accedes to his or her call or why, on the other hand, he or she rejects it. With respect to questions which ask here about the role that is played by human beings in exercising a free and responsible acceptance or, on the other hand, a free and responsible rejection, I will address these

within the created order of things. The fact that God justifies a person is something which is true about God according to an external designation. In this context thus, we encounter a paradox to the effect that we say, in truth, about God that he justifies a particular person or that he does not justify a particular person or that therefore he really does this or that he really does not do this and, at the same time, we say that the real difference which distinguishes between these two contradictory statements about God is with respect to something which exists outside of God: what exists as *gratia creata* (created grace) when we refer to whether or not a particular person has been blessed or not blessed.

While the Lutheran understanding of justification rejects every kind of *gratia creata*,³³ a grace that affects all human beings and which is constitutive of reality and which turns a human being into a "*nova creatura*" [a new creature] (2 Corinthians 5:17, Galatians 6:15), the Council of Trent teaches that "through the rebirth that is given to them [those born children of Adam's seed] through the merit of Christ's passion, grace is bestowed by which they become righteous" (DS 1523). After the Council has pointed out how, by God's activity and by our human co-operation, a preparation for justification is aroused, the Council then attends to a subsequent justification and speaks about it as something "which is not merely the remission of sins but which is also the sanctification and renewal of the interior person through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts whereby a wicked man becomes righteous" (DS 1528).

According to this statement about justification which is based more on a manner of presentation which works with biblical images, the Council speaks about this same reality in a manner which employs categories that are taken from scholastic theology. The created, contingent reality which corresponds to the self-giving of the Holy Spirit (see Acts 2:38 quoted in DS 1527) is paraphrased as follows: "Finally, the single formal cause is 'the justice of God, not that by which he himself is just, but that by which he makes us just' [Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 14, 12, 15], namely the justice which we have as a gift from him and by which we are spiritually renewed in the spirit of our minds. Thus, not only are we considered just, but we are truly called just and we are just, each one receiving within oneself one's own justice, according to the measure which the Holy Spirit apportions to each one individually as he wills and according to each one's personal disposition and cooperation" (DS 1529).³⁴

The same justice is asserted in the following paragraph with reference to Romans 5:5: "By the merit of the same most holy passion, 'God's love is poured through the Holy Spirit into the hearts' of those who are being justified and inheres in them" (DS 1530). And once again, it is said that God's justice is

questions in the last section of this essay when attending the received understanding of human freedom as this has come to us from Luther's thought.

33 The Council of Trent has this doctrine in mind when it teaches as follows: *Si quis dixerit, homines iustificari sola imputatione iustitiae Christi, vel sola peccatorum remissione, exclusa gratia et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum per Spiritum Sanctum diffundatur atque illis inhaereat, aut etiam gratiam, qua iustificamur, esse tantum favorem Dei: an. s.* [If anyone says that people are justified either by the imputation of Christ's justice alone, or by the remission of sins alone, **excluding grace and charity** which is poured into their hearts by the Holy Spirit and **inheres in them**, or also that the grace which justifies us is only the favor of God: anathema sit] (DS 1561).

34 Editorial note: Sala's citation of DS 1529 omits quotation marks and footnote references which would be informative for readers who might want to know about the origins of the Church's official teaching as this is given to us by the Council of Trent.

called our own because this justice is *nobis infunditur* [it is infused in us], hence, it can be said about us that *per eam nobis inhaerentem iustificamur* [we become just by its inherence in us] (DS 1547).

7 The theology of grace

7.1 Grace is a participation in the divine nature

One of the most fundamental passages in scripture which speaks about grace is found in 2 Peter 1.4: By his power God wills that "you will become partakers of the divine nature [*genēsthe koinōnoi*]." Although it is possible that the author is directly thinking about the ultimate object of God's salvific action (i.e., the possibility of a future likeness to God, which is mentioned in a number of different places within the New Testament), it cannot be doubted that deification is supposed to be viewed as a kind of seed germ which has already become a reality in the redeemed. Hence, in his first letter, at the point where John speaks about the same reality, John can claim: "We should be called children of God; and so we are...we are God's children now. But what we will be has not yet been revealed. We know that we shall be like him, when he shall appear, for we shall see him as he is " (3, 1f).³⁵

Based on texts as these refer to the aforementioned passage of John's letter and other texts (texts which come from the Church Fathers, especially the Fathers of the Eastern Church), the deification (*thēiōsis*) of human beings or even the bringing of this deification is proof of the fact that the third person of the Blessed Trinity, to which in particular the work of sanctification is attributed, must be of divine nature. Taking up a popular idea that the Church Fathers liked to consider, the liturgy of the Christmas season praises the *admirabile commercium* [the wonderful exchange] which occurs between the Incarnation of God and the deification of man.

The theologians of the Middle Ages continued, in the same way [as the Church Fathers], to understand the work of redemption and sanctification as this occurs through the earthly life of Christ and through the descent of the Holy Spirit and to interpret it in the context of their theology. What Christ has earned through his sacrifice and what the Holy Spirit gives to believers is a new life: an elevation of the human being from the state of being a creature to the state of being a child of God, participating in the life of God. Such a life – according to how these theologians, in their systematic considerations, have unfolded the truth of participating in God's life - must realize itself in actions and make manifest how the life of man differs from that of other earthly creatures (i.e., in their knowing and willing). For it is by way of these acts that, even by way of his own nature, it is now possible for a man to approach God and to draw near to him.

For this reason, revealed participation in the divine nature must be such that it allows us to see God as he is in himself (i.e., not as merely passing through the created world) and to cling to him in love. This beatific vision of God and perfect love of God is already given to the souls of the dead who are in the state of grace, "in which there is nothing to purify" (DS 1000), and also to the holy angels. Through the theological virtue of faith, believers here on earth enjoy an initial knowledge of God although, admittedly, no overt displays of God's divine being. Through the virtue of hope, these believers long for a union with God which is immediate whilst now, in this life, they cling to God through the divine

³⁵ Editorial note: The German text of 1 John 3:1f is partially translated on the basis of text which is taken from the Revised Standard Version, <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20John%203&version=RSV> (accessed November 4, 2013). The English translation which is offered, however, also attempts to reflect the phraseology of Sala's word choice.

gift of love: with that same love that exists for one's heavenly home according to the words of Saint Paul: "Love never fails" (1 Corinthians 13:8).

If we now consider how divine revelation emphasizes the transcendence of God and how it manifests the existence of transcendent beings in a manner which reveals their personal characteristics, it is only to be expected thus that the revealed participation of human beings in the divine nature is to be conceived in a manner which is remote from any notion which is grounded in the meaning of pantheistic conceptions. Indeed, the theological concept of person (as a *subsistens distinctum in natura intellectuali* [a distinct being subsisting in an intellectual nature]) connects two things: (1) the essential dynamism of intellectuality as an orientation that is directed toward the infinite of knowing and willing and (2) distinction as a distinguishing mark or feature which exists in itself. In the reflections that will now follow, two aspects of man's deification are to be investigated: the Holy Spirit as God bestowing himself on human beings (the Holy Spirit as *gratia increata* [uncreated grace]) and created reality (created reality as *gratia creata* [created grace]) which helps to constitute an elevation in our human stature as the result of our having received a divine gift.

7.2 The uncreated grace is the Holy Spirit who is sent to the justified as God's gift

The New Testament repeatedly speaks about two sendings of divine persons into the world:³⁶ the visible sending [mission] of the Son for the redemption of fallen man and the invisible sending [mission] of the Holy Spirit for the sanctification of redeemed man. In Galatians, we find one of the major sources in scripture wherein these two mysteries of faith are disclosed. In this letter, the apostle to the Gentiles speaks again about the doctrine of justification which comes through faith in Jesus Christ: "...when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons. And because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, "Abba! Father!" So through God you are no longer a slave but a son, and if a son then an heir" (4:4-7).³⁷

The Son is sent as a man; the Spirit of the Son is sent into the heart of man. The sending of the Son by the Father is often mentioned, especially in John's Gospel (3:16 f; 5:23, 8:16, 14:14, 20:21, etc.). Likewise, the New Testament speaks about the mission of the Holy Spirit as coming from the Father and the Son in a number of other places besides what is already given, for instance, in John 14:26 and 15:26.

In Galatians, when speaking about both missions, Paul uses the term *exapostellô* [sent forth], which usually has a technical meaning (in conjunction with similar terms such as *apostellô* [send] and *pempô* [send] that we also find in the New Testament): the person, who is sent, receives a special authority from the person who sends one in order to fulfill a task for persons to whom one has been sent. In addition, however, on the basis of other expressions, it is clearly evident that the Holy Spirit is sent since it is said of him that he is given (John 14:16; Romans 5:5); that he will receive (Romans 8:11;

³⁶ With respect to what is contained in this section, I especially rely on the last chapter of the systematic part of Lonergan's *De Deo Trino* where Lonergan deals with the topic of the *divinae missiones* [the divine missions]. On how Aquinas deals with this question, see the *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 48 on the *De missione divinarum personarum* [On the mission of the divine persons].

³⁷ Editorial note: The text of Galatians 4:4-7 which is being quoted here is taken from the Revised Standard Version.

Galatians 3:2); that Paul has it (1 Corinthians 7:40), that he dwells in believers (Romans 8:9-11, 1 Corinthians 3:16), and that he is poured out (Acts 2:33).

These divine sendings – where a divine person sends another divine person – do not mean, according to the understanding of the New Testament, that these missions are to be understood in an arbitrary way as if they can also be reversed where the Son could have sent his Father in a visible way and the Holy Spirit could have sent the Son (if it had pleased God to do so). The divine missions, about which the New Testament speaks, instead include a corresponding real relationship of dependence which exists in terms of the origin of the messenger from the sender. In other words, a divine person is sent only by the person (or by the persons) from which it proceeds, and it is constituted by this emergence as a distinct real person. According to the kind of expression which we find in the language of theology: the divine “*missiones*” [the divine missions] *ad extra* [to the outside] depend on the divine “*processiones*” [the divine processions] which exist from within; or again, in other words, we say that the economic Trinity exists as a consequence of the immanent Trinity - certainly not as the result of a necessary consequence where we would say that God cannot be other than who he is, but because of his free decision to render to fallen man, through the redemptive work of the Son and the sanctification of the Holy Spirit, the dignity of divine sonship.³⁸

The above being said however - namely, that the divine missions are associated with the divine processions – this applies only to the missions in a strict sense. However, where in the New Testament we find talk about a divine person who is sent in the sense that the sending creates a finite effect, what we have is a mission which exists in a broader sense. In the latter case, the three divine persons all produce the same effect³⁹ because all the works of God *ad extra* are produced through knowing and

38 Editorial note: as Aquinas had argued respectively in the *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 43, a. 1 and 1a, q. 43, a. 2, ad 3 (as cited by Ormerod, “A trajectory from Augustine to Aquinas and Lonergan: Contingent predication and the Trinity,” p. 5):

Thus the mission of a divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the procession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a new way of existing in another; thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature.

Mission signifies not only procession from the principle, but *also determines the temporal term of the procession*. Hence mission is only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the eternal procession, with the addition of a temporal effect. For the relation of a divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence the procession may be called a twin procession, eternal and temporal, *not that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double term, temporal and eternal*.

39 However, according to the same “order“ that is appropriate for a given divine person to come from another divine person. Editorial note: as Augustine had argued in the *De Trinitate*, 5, 15: “We must confess that the Father and the Son are the origin of the Holy Spirit; not two origins, but just as the Father and Son are one God, and with reference to creation one creator and one lord, so with reference to the Holy Spirit they are one origin; but with reference to creation Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one origin, just as they are one creator and one lord.”

willing which, as knowing and willing, belongs to God's essence and therefore to all three persons who are acting together.

On the other hand however, this does not prevent the fact that certain attributes which belong to the essence of God can be understood also to belong to all three persons because of a certain resemblance which exists with respect to the *attributa propria* [personal attributes] (or, in other words, the meaning of *notionalia* [notions] which refer to attributes which distinguish a person) in order to designate a particular divine person (i.e., they are appropriate to a given divine person). The same applies to any actions *ad extra* which, as such, are common to all three persons.

The integrity of the sendings with the processions will now be clarified by analyzing a sending in greater detail. If it is true that the Father sends the Son, it is true that the Father is the sender and not the messenger, and, conversely, that the Son is not the sender but the Messenger. Hence, in expressing what is said of the Father and the Son, the predicates are mutually exclusive and they cannot be arbitrarily switched or interchanged with each other. The same situation applies with respect to the sending of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son. However, contradictory predicates as these refer to God can only be given if they are predicated of the individual persons as distinct from each other, with respect thus to how they differ from each other. This difference refers to their respective relations of origin which are constitutive of the divine persons. Now, if a sending is predicated of a divine person, it is a truth that belongs to the fourth of the aforementioned classes of true statements that are made about God: it is a statement that is properly predicated of a divine person and it is also a contingent truth (as indeed is the case when we refer to the whole order of salvation).

When applied to the sending of the Holy Spirit as this occurs with respect to the justification of man according to the testimony of Scripture and the understanding of theologians (apart from any differences in their declaration), the fact that we work here with a truth of the fourth class with respect to the constitution of this sending (i.e., with respect to the reality in which there is this mission) means as follows:

God the Father and Son, as a single principle, send the Holy Spirit, i.e., in order to make clear that the Holy Spirit is *amor procedens* [proceeding love] by which they love one another; accordingly, as a single love that emerges from them, the Holy Spirit is sent to the justified. But, in giving his own love, what is meant is nothing more than a giving of themselves. Therefore, the Father and the Son, together with the love which proceeds from them, begins to dwell within the justified. This explains why, after having rendered the word of Jesus in the farewell discourse, John goes on to say: "I will ask the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you forever" (14:16) and soon afterwards, he adds: "We will come to him and live with him" (14:23).

With respect to the constitution of the sending (taken actively), the infinite perfection of the two sending persons which is identical to the infinite perfection which belongs to all three divine persons is sufficient. As common, it refers to God's oneness. For the divine nature (and thus all three divine persons according to the order in which they have this nature) can become all that which it knows and wills in its wisdom, goodness, and power. Now, when the three divine persons send their gift of love to the justified as this results from the proceeding love of Father and Son, the Holy Spirit goes to the justified and makes his home in them. It is true thus that the Holy Spirit himself is only understood as a *relatio rationis* [a relation of reason]. But, this does not mean that he does not really give himself to the justified. We are again faced with the paradox about which I had spoken earlier at the end of

Section 5: God really and truly creates the world without this new creation adding a new reality to himself.

However, insofar as a sending is said of something which is temporal and contingent, it requires an adequate created reality as a *conditio consequens ad extra*, i.e., a created reality which exists in the justified about whom or to whom it is said that the Father and Son has sent the Holy Spirit. This reality refers to the existence of *created grace* which now exists within the justified. The created grace does not constitute the sending but, instead, it shows that it has really occurred. Created grace will be discussed in the following section. Here, however, suffice it to say that created grace exists as a consequence of the sending of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son. It participates in the activity of *spiratio* (spiration) and, therefore, it establishes a particular relation of the justified to the Holy Spirit.

The same is true of the Holy Spirit with respect to the sending of the Holy Spirit. As the third person is constituted by a real relation of origin with respect to the other two divine persons, i.e., *ab aliis* [from the others], this relation is also identical to the infinite perfection of Divine Being. But, where an infinite perfection is present, no new reality is necessary or possible in order to constitute the sending of the Holy Spirit; however, a corresponding finite reality is needed if we are to speak about the indwelling of the Holy Spirit within the life of a given person. Such a created reality exists as the *habitus caritatis* [the habit of charity] and it exists as a participation in the passive *spiratio* [the passive spiration] and hence, as such, it lays the ground for the relation of the justified to the Father and the Son: a relation which makes him capable of loving these divine persons with the kind of supernatural love which is the Holy Spirit dwelling within him.

The same analogy, which our reason has used to know about the contingent work of God *ad extra* and which was used to understand how the Holy Spirit effects our human sanctification, can also be used to explain the other divine mission which we know about from Revelation, i.e., the visible mission of the second divine person as this exists with respect to his incarnation. To be sure, the two sendings differ in several aspects. With respect to the gift of the Holy Spirit, the *terminus ad extra*, materially speaking, is an already existing human nature (i.e., a person) because the agreement in grace takes place between persons while, with respect to the Incarnation, materially speaking, the *terminus ad extra* refers to a non-subsistent human nature because of an agreement which occurs within a divine person.

The mission of the eternal Son of God must therefore be understood in the following manner: The one who is begotten eternally from the Father is begotten in time as a man. Because the Son in his person is consubstantial with the Father, as a consequence of this, he wants what the Father also wants: he, the Son, wants to become man but in a manner which precludes adding the constitution of the Incarnation to the Son's reality as God. This is because of the Son's infinite being, the being by which he subsists eternally.⁴⁰ Hence, within its infinity or from this infinity, this being begins to exist in time as man, i.e.,

40 Editorial note: In order to understand how, through his divine act of existence, Christ as Word exists as both God and man, see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., *The Incarnate Word*, trans. Charles C. Hefling, Jr. (Chestnut Hill, MA: Theology Department, Boston College, 1989), pp. 166-168. In his analysis, Lonergan distinguishes between understanding the doctrine of Christ's single act of existence on the basis of an analogy which refers to the nature of finite, composite being and understanding this same doctrine on the basis of an analogy which attends to the nature of an infinite principle, Christ's act of existence (or Christ's act of being as an act of existence) existing as an infinite principle. On the

this same being takes its non-subsistent human nature from the Blessed Virgin and brings it to himself as a subsisting being so that the Son exists through his eternal divine being, both as God and as man.

And, again, this statement of faith [referring to Christ's Incarnation],⁴¹ which says something contingent about God, has its truth through an appropriate *terminus ad extra*: a substantial but secondary being which exists within an assumed human nature. It is a being which exceeds the proportion of an assumed nature and therefore it is a being which is absolutely supernatural. This being which is not proportionate to the assumed nature constructs no new *ens unum* [no new one being] and so it is not a human person.

St. Thomas has repeatedly spoken about the presence of one divine Being being within the Incarnation of the Son of God. See, for example, the *Summa Theologiae*, 3a, q. 17, *De unitate Christi quoad esse* [On the unity of Christ's existence],⁴² where he writes in article 2: *impossibile est quod unius rei non sit unum esse* [it is impossible that one thing should not have one act of existence]. However, in the *Quaestio disputata de unione Verbi incarnati* [On the union of the Incarnate Word], a. 4,⁴³ he speaks about an *esse secundarium* [a secondary act of existence] as the incarnate Son of God, *non in quantum est aeternum, sed in quantum est temporaliter homo factum temporaliter* [not in so far as he is eternal, but in so far as he is a man who exists in time and who has come to be made within time]. As Thomas had explained, this secondary act of being exists as a substantial being and because it exists as the consequence of a supernatural reality (a hypostatic union), it exists as an absolutely supernatural being (as a *gratia unionis* [as a grace of union]) which, as a created participation in divine fatherhood, establishes a real relation to human nature (this nature being accepted) with respect to the second divine person.

basis of an analogy which attends to the meaning and nature of infinite being, Lonergan notes that “where there is an infinite principle every other principle is utterly superfluous.” In other words, it is to be more fully stated that “a principle that is infinite in perfection is in itself an utterly sufficient principle, and the same principle without change suffices [to account] for contradictions, provided there remains a difference in the consequent external term.” Cf. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., *The Incarnate Word*, trans. Charles C. Hefling, Jr. (Chestnut Hill, MA: Theology Department, Boston College, 1989), pp. 166-167. Please note too

41 Editorial note: The reference to Christ's Incarnation is inserted as a help to readers which might wonder about what “this statement of faith” refers to.

42 Editorial note: *De unitate Christi quoad esse* has been translated as “On the unity of Christ's being” or “On the unity of Christ's existence.” Depending on the context of its use, *esse* can refer to “act of existence” or “act of being” as “act of existence.” Christ's infinite being can be more accurately translated if we refer to Christ's infinite act of existence.

43 Parma, Vol. IX, pp. 533-544; see especially p. 542. Editorial note: As Lonergan had noted in his *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, trans. Michael G. Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2002), p. 121, Aquinas always affirms that, in Christ, a “single act of existence” is to be admitted. However, in the *Quaestio disputata de unione Verbi incarnati*, Aquinas admits that, in Christ's incarnation, a “secondary substantial act of existence” is to be found. In the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, 4, 41, as Lonergan argues, Aquinas “expressly states that there is no union more similar to the incarnation than the union of body and soul; however, he expressly denies that this similarity consists in the soul's relation to the body as form to matter...the only similarity is in this, that as the body is the proper and conjoined instrument of the soul, so the assumed humanity is the proper and conjoined instrument of the Word.”

7.3 On the theology of created grace

The aim of this study is to present a philosophical argument from which it follows that, if one believes in justification through God's revelation - and this justification, according to this revelation, consists in the forgiveness of sins and the sanctification of human beings – then, besides the *primum donum* [the first gift] (*Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 38, a. 2), i.e., the Holy Spirit, by which a justified person is endowed, one must also accept the *donum creatum* [a created gift].⁴⁴ How now the created gift is to be understood is a question which continues to be open with respect to the argument which we have so far presented. Our knowledge of *gratia creata*, as with our knowledge of other supernatural realities, does not depend on how far we are able to move toward a possible understanding of them.

In fact, the theological tradition has dealt intensively with the question of grace. The theology of grace which, until a few decades ago within the Catholic Church,⁴⁵ was regarded as *doctrina recepta* [received doctrine] – a teaching which had also found its way into doctrinal statements (especially at the Council of Trent) – this theology of grace goes back to the beginnings of scholasticism in the 11th Century and a systematic penetration of the truths of faith which had begun at that time.⁴⁶

As the *analogatum princeps* [the primary analogate], the philosophical teaching of the scholastics about natural life lies at the basis of the scholastic teaching about created grace - an analogy which is already recommended because, in revelation, man's elevation to become an adopted son of God is understood to exist as a higher form of life that is granted to him. According to this analogy, grace exists as an absolutely supernatural *habitus* [habit] which, as an accidental form (*Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae, q. 110, a. 2, ad 2) or, more precisely, as a quality,⁴⁷ is received into the essence of the human soul (i.e., within man's substantial form).⁴⁸ As an accidental form of our substantial form, grace effects a kind of rebirth or a re-creation of man who has been graced where, by it, man participates in the divine nature.⁴⁹

From this habit, the theological virtues emerge which differ from each other but which function as the proximate principles of appropriate actions; they emerge from grace in a manner which resembles how our properties emerge from the essence of our souls. From the same grace comes the gifts of the Holy Spirit - gifts which make graced souls inclined to abide by the promptings of the Holy Spirit (*ibid.*, q. 68, a. 1). Grace, however, is not only the source of infused theological virtues which relate directly to God; it is also, through grace, that the natural moral virtues become principles of supernatural acts

44 See Scheffczyk, “‘Ungeschaffene’ und ‘geschaffene’ Gnade. Zur Vertiefung des Gnadenverständnisses” [“‘Uncreated’ and ‘created’ Grace. Deepening our Understanding of Grace”] in *FKTh* 15 (1999) 81-97. In the article, the essential elements of the doctrine of grace are presented with particular reference to the Protestant rejection of created grace and the Catholic doctrine of created grace.

45 Editorial note: Sala's reference to “a few decades ago” probably refers to the years which immediately followed the conclusion of the Second Vatican Council in 1965.

46 See, for example, the multi-volume work of A. M. Landgraf, *Die Gnadenlehre. Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* [The Doctrine of Grace. A History of Dogma in Early Scholasticism], Regensburg 1952 ff.

47 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae, q. 110, a. 2c.

48 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae, q. 110, a. 4.

49 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae, q. 110, a. 4.

which make human life more and more akin to the life of a child of God. Through the supernatural virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the lower parts of the soul become subject to reason and reason itself become subject to God (*ibid.*, q. 113, a. 1) so that, in man, there arises that justice [or that justification]⁵⁰ by which human beings are moved by God toward eternal life. By living out the grace that comes to fruition in the practice of the virtues, an interpersonal relation is created between God and man: the divine persons and human beings begin to live within each other as a known is known in a knower and as a beloved is loved in a lover. Such a condition constitutes what is theologically referred to when we speak about the indwelling of the Holy Spirit within the lives of graced persons.

7.4 Two other explanations on the relation which exists between uncreated and created grace

The previously outlined theological understanding of uncreated and created grace which we have given presupposes Catholic defined doctrine in terms which say that justification "is not only the remission of sins but also the sanctification and renewal of the interior person" (DS 1528). This sanctification consists in the fact that a person is given God's gift, the Holy Spirit, and consequently he is given sanctifying grace as an inherent participation in God's divine nature.⁵¹

Now, while all Catholic theologians are united in acknowledging both the existence of uncreated grace and the existence of created grace, they differ in explaining how they relate to each other. According to the explanation given above, the gift of the Holy Spirit is given to the justified as the *primum donum* (*Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q.38, a.2) that is given in the sending (the mission) of the same Holy Spirit. This sending, in turn, consists in the relation of origin (the *relatio originis*) which constitutes the Holy Spirit in such a way, however, that it requires a suitable *terminus ad extra* as a consequent condition.⁵²

Lonergan's explanation consists in applying a general principle about reality which corresponds to a contingent truth about God. In this sense, it is not an *ad hoc* explanation. But, it is not the only explanation nor is it even most favored among theologians who offer explanations about the relation which exists between *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*. Lonergan mentions two other theories.

A first theory, which comes to us from Gabriel Vazquez SJ (+1604),⁵³ presupposes the divine

⁵⁰ Editorial note: *Gerechtigkeit* can be translated as "justice" or as "justification."

⁵¹ That justification includes the sanctification of persons seems also to be recognized by Lutheran theologians. In fact, the *Joint Declaration* speaks about "the reception of the Holy Spirit in baptism" (11). In addition, "both aspects of the action of God's grace must not be separated from each other...both the forgiveness of sins and the holy presence of God" (22). Also, the fact that the same theologians reject the presence of any kind of created grace because grace "can be found only in the identity of the Holy Spirit" (as Scheffczyk argues about the position of the Protestant theologian, W. Dandine, in "Ungeschaffene' und 'geschaffene' Gnade," *FKTh* 15 [1999], 82) seems to confirm the fact that man's sanctification is part of justification.

⁵² As the basis of his theory, for what lies ahead, Lonergan specified the following philosophical thesis: "What is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons is constituted by the divine perfection itself, but it has a consequent condition in an appropriate external term" (*The Triune God: Systematics*, p. 439 [Assertion 15]).

⁵³ As modern representatives of this theory, Lonergan refers to Paul Galtier SJ, *De SS. Trinitate in se et in nobis* [On the Most Holy Trinity in Itself and in Us], Paris: Apud Gabrielem Beauchesne et filios, 1933; *L'habitation de nous des trois Personnes* [The Dwelling Within Us of Three

processions by which the Son and the Holy Spirit are constituted as divine persons. However, it understands the sending of the Holy Spirit to the justified as something which exists or which is constituted as a *terminus ad extra* [as an external term] i.e., through the sanctifying grace that is given to the justified. However, as with all finite realities, this is all caused by God. It is the joint work of all three divine persons and, hence, by this means, man's relation to all three divine persons is constituted. Because of its nature (we refer to the gift of God's love for man), the giving of this gift is ascribed to the Holy Spirit who, as notional love, is the first gift of God. This explains why the tradition has seen a connection between the Holy Spirit and the blessedness of man, from which (only as appropriated!), a relation of the justified to the third person in the Holy Trinity is to be admitted and thus, according to the same language, an indwelling of the Holy Spirit within man.

The other theory is traced back to the earlier work of Dionysius Petavius SJ (+1652) who attempted to explain the sanctification of man by the Holy Spirit by referring to the substantial presence of the Holy Spirit within the righteous which accordingly sanctifies a man, existing within man as a *quasi forma* [as a kind of form] and as a *sui coniunctione* [a union which belongs to him] which accordingly turns a man into an adoptive son.⁵⁴ In the twentieth century, this approach was taken up by Maurice de la Taille SJ,⁵⁵ and also by Karl Rahner SJ,⁵⁶ and it was developed as a theologumenon which appears to be most currently favored by theologians at the present time.

While, according to Lonergan, the gift of the Holy Spirit is constituted by the Holy Spirit giving himself, this theory tries to explain the same gift as a kind of union of the infinite with the finite. For this purpose, this theory works with an analogy which refers to the nature of created things, i.e., they are composed of matter and form, or of essence and existence, or of potency and act. Hence, the Holy Spirit is thought of as a form that exists within the soul of the justified; the resulting condition is the presence of sanctifying grace within man which exists as an accidental reality. Hence, the Incarnation of God's Son is explained by the fact that his divine being actuates, in an eminent way, an individual human essence (an individual human nature).

However, on closer examination, we find that no true resemblance exists between the constitution of the infinite and the composition of the finite. The finite is composed of mutually complementary ontological principles because it is finite. However, as finite, the finite excludes the infinite. As a consequence, the infinite does not need to be associated in any way whatsoever with a human person as its formal cause in order for it to give itself to him as *amor procedens* [as proceeding love]. It is also the case too that the Son of God does not need to be united with a human nature as its eminent act in order to turn it into its own human nature.

In addition, in a finite being, matter is composed with form in a manner which leads to the emergence

Persons], Rome 1949.

⁵⁴ See *LThK2*, VIII, 314.

⁵⁵ "Actuation créé par acte increé [Actuation Created by Uncreated Act]," in: *Recherches de Sciences Religieuses* 18 (1928) 253-268.

⁵⁶ "Zur scholastischen Begrifflichkeit der ungeschaffenen Gnade [On the Scholastic Terminology of Uncreated Grace]," in *ZKTh*, 63 (1939) 137-157; reprinted in *Schriften zur Theologie* [Theological Investigations] Bd. I, 1960, 347-375; "Gott 'teilt sich in quasi formaler Ursächlichkeit dem endlichen Seienden mit,'" ["God 'communicates himself into the quasi-formal causality of finite being'"] (362).

of essence from potency. In addition, an essence is composed with act in a manner which also points to a thing's existence as it emerges from a condition of potency. But now, our soul, as a finite spirit, for its part, is not by any means in a condition of potency with respect to what exists as a supernatural principle of actions which refer to God as he exists in himself. The same is true with respect to the Incarnation: the nature which was adopted by the Son of God was in a condition potency with respect to the being of a human person. But, as adopted, it is the human nature of a divine person.

An alternative to postulating an *ad hoc* kind of analogy which attends to the relation which exists between the constitution of the infinite and the composition of the finite can be considered, however, if we appeal to what we can know if we work with a philosophical theology that, in its own right, is indubitable even if, of course, we should believe that the properties and power of the Infinite is something that we can never understand: how God, as the infinite act which he is, not only knows and wills everything which is necessary but also everything which exists contingently, God being not only necessary to himself through the same infinite act of being but also contingent to himself when we refer to God as incarnate and also as a gift that is given to a justified man.⁵⁷ In other words: with respect to a divine person, if you want to speak about a divine person in terms which speak about from an "eminent act" (or from an "eminent form"), then this act or this form is the infinite perfection of God as He is in Himself; this act (or form) is and constitutes all that God understands and wills as that which should be or that which constitutes a divine person. In doing so, we avoid appealing to a dubious likeness of God as this is found when we refer to the composition of finite things.⁵⁸

8 Towards a theology in the current context

In this paper, it has been shown that the Catholic doctrine of created grace has rightly emerged. If we assume, as true, that "God's righteousness" (Romans 1:16) exists through faith in Christ's redemption in a manner which leads to "our righteousness" (1 Corinthians 1:30), then it is not in itself rational that we should negate the existence of a contingent reality that is received by all persons who are justified.

However, on the other hand, this does not mean that this reality is to be understood in only one way in a theological reflection which is then put into concepts. Why this is so is because theology is a product not only of faith but also of culture.⁵⁹ Its task is to mediate between the truth of salvation and the existence of an historical and intellectual context and so, for this reason, it must attend to a current culture and take it into account. The aforementioned theology of created grace which we have presented was developed by Christian thinkers with respect to a culture that, since the 11th Century, had been developing on a basis that was formed by a rediscovery of the heritage which had belonged to the culture of classical antiquity. However, as a result of profound changes which have occurred in

⁵⁷ See Lonergan, *De constitutione Christi*, 97 [Editorial note: please note that, in our translation, the reference to p. 97 is an approximate reference. In the original German text, Sala refers to a p. 56 as this is found in the Latin text which he has of Lonergan's *De constitutione Christi*. The reference to p. 97 refers instead to the pagination of a later edition which cites Latin on one side and English on the other. See Bernard Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, trans. Michael G. Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002). The reference to p. 97 is determined by examining the context of Sala's argument and by then comparing this text to what Lonergan is apparently saying on p. 97 of the later, newer edition].

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁵⁹ See no. 4 above towards the end.

“western” culture since the dawn of the modern era, we are now able to see the limits of traditional scholastic teaching. Our present culture differs from other cultures according to three main components which have had a greater impact on the development of theology than what had been the case in an earlier era when we refer to the kind of culture which had existed then and how, from within it, the doctrine of created grace had developed.

First, we refer to a new conception of science. The medieval view was based on the *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle. Science was seen to exist as a sure and certain knowledge of truths which exist in a universal and necessary way. However, in modern science, we can also move toward a knowledge and understanding of individual things and of things which also exist in a contingent manner. In this science, we do not move indifferently toward a possible knowledge of truth but toward a knowledge of truth which is content with tentative approximations.

Second, we refer to a new conception of philosophy. For Aristotle, philosophy was essentially metaphysics which, as the science of being, was formed into a total and basic science. As a consequence thus, the basic terms and theorems of subaltern sciences basically existed as metaphysical terms and relations which have been specified further, according to different levels of being. Modern science, in each of its divisions, defines its own basic terms and relations and, as a result, it has become independent of philosophy. Since, now, the entire visible world belongs to the realm of (natural) science, philosophy has turned to human interiority, i.e., to intentional consciousness.

Third and lastly, the same turn to the subject (mentioned above) led to a distinction which distinguishes the human sciences from the natural sciences where here the human sciences are concerned with the human world or the world of human culture with respect to a) how, as a spirit within matter, man exists as a composite of material elements and meaning, having an origin that lies in man's intelligent, rational, and moral consciousness, and b) how man is motivated by values which are striven towards and which constructed by our human designs. This has led to a further branch that is derived from the human sciences which seek a kind of knowledge that exists in a universal way: the historical-interpretive sciences (human studies and scholarship)⁶⁰ which view the human world from an individual and historical perspective.

In the first category belongs a theology that deals with a reality as it has arisen from the fact of God's saving plan and as this plan has been realized in the human, historical world, passing through the intentional consciousness of Christian generations. Now, if grace exists as a reality which belongs to the order of salvation as a world of meanings and values that is both divine and human, then the obvious approach for entering into an understanding of the grace of intentional consciousness is the origin of meanings and values that co-constitute the existence of our human world and which acts as their motivations. Such an understanding may, by no means, not put aside the insights of scholastic theology because what the Holy Spirit of the pilgrim Church has given over time is insight into the truth of salvation in a manner which obliges the Church into the future.

In order to communicate the truth of salvation in the context of our contemporary culture, as a basis for obtaining general categories, the theologian must thematize his intentional consciousness by being attentive to data as this exists in his inquiry and understanding, in his reflection and judgments, and in

⁶⁰ See B. Lonergan, *Method in der Theologie*, Leipzig: Benno Verlag 1991, 233f, 315, 364. [Editorial note: Sala cites from the German edition of Lonergan's *Method in Theology*]

his weighing and deciding, adverting to the structure which exists in these performances and to the actions that arise from it. A transcendental structure is found to exist and therefore a transcultural structure which is organized on the basis of different patterns of experience, the structures of these patterns being differentiated in different societies and in successive epochs.

However, in order to obtain categories which are particularly and specifically theological, the theologian will thematize religious experience with respect to its basic personal dimension and also with respect to what has been the testimony and history of the Christian community. Such an experience has its source in the gift of God's love about which Paul speaks in Romans 5:5. This love of God leads the dynamism of transcendence toward its consummation as this is shown in the context of our human moral life (self-transcendence for the sake of what is better or more good), this self-transcendence toward the good being already constitutive of consciousness within a cognitive context (as in self-transcendence toward being). The love of God leads us toward an affective self-transcendence which, in the context of interpersonal love, already comes into play in a way that leads to an other worldly, supernatural perfection.

This love of God leads the dynamism of transcendence toward its consummation which, both in its cognitive phase (self-transcendence toward being) and in its moral phase (self-transcendence toward good), is already constitutive of consciousness. The love of God leads the affective self-transcendence which is already operative in interpersonal love toward its transcendent, supernatural perfection.

It is precisely in the gift of transcendent love, not as a single act but as a dynamic state – that reality which, traditionally had been called beatific grace -- from which individual acts emerge, that we can have a theology which has shifted from a metaphysical psychology that is stamped with an Aristotelian-scholastic imprint to an intentionality analysis.⁶¹

If one thematizes the human world which is constituted by meanings and their motivations, and if one overcomes a naive realist point of view which equates reality with material reality, then one can see that the views which had been expressed by Luther with respect to *iustificatio forensis* [forensic justification] (cf. DS 1561)⁶² are not necessarily to be understood as an alternative to the teaching of Trent even if, in fact, in this way, it has been understood. For, here, the sentence of a merciful God who says that "your sins are forgiven you" is being understood on an analogy which refers to the acquittal of a human judge. To conclude that God's act of acquittal effects no real change in a justified person, to say in this context that no "effective" justification occurs is only understandable if we take the view that the acquittal of the human judge is but a mere word, corresponding to nothing in reality. This conception of law can only be maintained if the human world as a whole is reduced to being a merely nominal world in which only a prescribed, predetermined nature is held to be real. In other words, we have a situation where not only the law but also all orders of human life and all interpretations of life and the world are to be viewed as having no other reality other than what exists in the being or the constitution of material components.

61 See B. Lonergan, *Method in der Theologie*, pp. 285-296 [German edition].

62 Editorial note: DS 1561 reads as follows: "If anyone says that men are justified either by the imputation of Christ's justice alone, or by the remission of sins alone, excluding grace and charity which is poured into their hearts by the Holy Spirit and inheres in them, or also that the grace which justifies us is only the favor of God, *anathema sit*." Cf. Neuner and Dupuis, p. 568.

And once again, the argument which has been developed above applies: God's acquittal, as something which is identical with the necessary and immutable reality of God, cannot alone explain the contingent truth of our salvation as this exists for us in terms of the here and now. This truth demands, other than the "grace of God" (DS 1561), a reality which exists within the order of created grace just as, similarly, the truth which belongs to the saying of a judge is something which corresponds to a reality which constitutive of a juridical order (an order which is constitutive of a legal community and of the persons who exist as legal subjects).⁶³

9. Understanding the Faith and Human Rationality

It is known that Luther's thinking was characterized by a number of major tensions.⁶⁴ This applies especially to the doctrine of justification which is located in the midst of his theology: the acceptance of the "God's righteousness" (Romans 10:3) takes place in a sinful man having free will while Luther holds to a man's having a *servum arbitrium* [servile will]. The peculiarity of this doctrine can be correctly detected, in my opinion, when one examines Luther's philosophical presuppositions which weigh not only on his theology but also on the theological tradition which was initiated by him.

Against the background of an extremely voluntaristic conception of God that comes to us from Ockham, against Erasmus, in his writing, *De servo arbitrio* [On the Bondage of the Will], Luther acknowledges freedom of choice for human beings with respect to the civil area (*in rebus inferioribus* [in earthly things]) but more strongly does he deny any complete freedom with respect to our relation with God and thus also with respect to our salvation. Thus, as a result, Luther brought a disastrous split into the life of human beings in a way which has contributed to the secularization of the *civitas hominis* [the city of man]. However, more important theologically is an understanding of the relation which exists between God's sovereignty and man's freedom which is apparent in his writings: human action and God's work, as a (transcendental) first cause, stand in competition with each other so that, as a consequence, man can only be free to the extent that God's sovereignty is a bit withdrawn. Because Luther could not escape from anything which refers to the question of God and salvation and because he did not want to escape from anything having to do with the question of God and salvation, he came to a position which he illustrated in a famous picture which depicts human free will as a beast of burden that is lacking in the freedom to choose between God and Satan as a rider and so, once mounted, our human will must go where its rider wants it to go (WA 18, 635).⁶⁵

63 Whatever one may think about we can conceive of a new attitude of God towards man whereby God forgives sins and adopts us as sons, in this context, ideas are predicated of an immutable, absolute being who exists outside of time. These predications express a contingent truth about man; and so, consequently, the reference to the reality of God does not suffice in order to explain a correspondence to this (contingent) without which this truth cannot exist. This holds in particular for the "two points of view" by which means Lutheran theologians seek to interpret the truth of justification: in the sight of a person who is justified, it remains that one is always "totally a sinner"; in the sight of God, the same person is totally righteous (see *JD*, 29). What does the second point of view see in God? Would a man's justification not exist if God had not justified a given man (or woman)? Here, a product of fantasy is confused with an argument of reason.

64 José Martin-Palma even speaks about Luther's "religious irrationalism" in *Gnadenlehre von der Reformation bis zur Gegenwart* [The Doctrine of Grace from the Reformation to the Present] (Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte, III/5b), Freiburg 1980, 13.

65 Editorial note: citing Luther's own words as taken from *The Bondage of the Will*, trans.

It is not possible to address the problem of human freedom and the order of grace in a comprehensive manner. The following points can, at least, be mentioned:

- 1) The distinction which exists between two ontologically disproportionate orders: nature and supernature (grace). However, this distinction is not disparity.
- 2) Freedom exists as an essential constitutive element in being human. The view that man has lost this freedom as a result of the Fall (*res de solo titulo* [freedom of the will for good is “merely a name”]:⁶⁶ Luther, WA 1, 354), implies a change in the nature of man about which one cannot refer to the data of revelation. However, this does not imply a denial of the doctrine that, as a consequence of human rebellion against God as well as a loss of grace, a disorder exists in man's human nature (*vulneratus in naturalibus* [man is “wounded in his nature”]).
- 3) Because of the difference between the two orders of being, man can do nothing without grace existing in the supernatural order, not because he is not free but because an ontologically lower principle cannot do what belongs to a higher order of being.
- 4) Grace as a participation in divine nature raises human beings to a supernatural level. Consequently, in his being, man will become an adequate principle for supernatural acts that, ultimately, lead to the goal of eternal salvation. This is what is meant when we refer to why the actions of justified persons are to be regarded as meritorious acts.

If the above mentioned truths which are indispensable for a Catholic understanding of justification are not totally denied but are pushed aside, the many statements of the *Joint Declaration* about freedom, grace, works and merit come to have an ambivalent meaning which can bring the Catholic reader to a condition of despair if, from the document, the reader wants to know where the consensus exists. Only one of these statements should be mentioned in this context: “The freedom they possess [a] in relation to persons and the things of this world [b] is no freedom in relation to salvation” (*JD*, 19). However, why do we have statement [a]? Is its truth not self-evident? Then, why do we have statement [b]? Will we say that man without grace (i.e., as a “natural principle”) cannot be operative within the order of the supernatural? Is this not again self-evident? However - and the precision is important - the self-evidence does not refer to the fact that human beings would not be free with regard to the supernatural order (as the statement says) but, radically, that it is not an adequate principle for it - regardless of whether man, in his nature, is free or not free. The reference point for defining the supernatural is not

James I. Packer; O. R. Johnston (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Fleming H. Revell, 1992), pp. 103-104:

So man's will is like a beast standing between two riders. If God rides, it wills and goes where God wills; as the Psalm says, “*I am become as a beast before thee*” (Psalm 73:22-3). If Satan rides, it wills and goes where Satan wills. Nor may it choose to which rider it will run, or which it will seek; but the riders themselves fight to decide who shall have and hold it.

66 Editorial note: this translation of *res de solo titulo* is taken from the following internet sources: http://archive.org/stream/cu31924092354426/cu31924092354426_djvu.txt, accessed February 15, 2014. Please note though that the Latin *titulo* can be translated by us as “titular” or “nominal.”

freedom but the nature of man (in the sense of *natura pura* [pure nature]). In this regard, the lack of clarity in the *Joint Declaration* points to its being an ambiguous and misleading source for the whole doctrine of justification.

The Catholic doctrine explicitly recognizes the necessity of moving to a higher level so that a person can do something within the sphere of the supernatural – precisely as a person who has been elevated, and functioning thus as a freely active principle. This is why Catholic doctrine also acknowledges the existence of "actual" grace which a person needs in order to prepare for justification. Any statement alleging an underlying conception which speaks about a competitive relationship between a transcendent first cause and a created second cause is an error that has to be rejected simply for philosophical reasons - and this both within the order of nature as well as within the order of grace. In conclusion: Grace makes a man, who is free by nature, to be a responsible co-worker of a saving God within the realm of supernatural nature and not to be a "merely passive" recipient (GE 21).⁶⁷ This is recognized by Augustine who had noted: *Qui ergo fecit te sine te, te non iustificat sine te* ["God created us without us: but he did not will to save us without us"].⁶⁸

In addition however, another consequence of Luther's views about the relation which exists between primary and secondary causality together with his views about how he understands the nature of a morally evil choice (which are not reasonable or acceptable) is to be mentioned here. Assuming as an undeniable truth that God's will is irresistible, Luther aligns how he understands the will of God with respect to the predestination of the elect with how he wants to understand the reprobation of the damned. He writes that "intentionally [of His own will] and without their being able to change [this will], God makes people worthy of condemnation" (WA 18, 633).⁶⁹

67 This is again asserted immediately afterwards by a saying which notes that Lutherans "thereby exclude any possibility of contributing to one's own justification." However, note the ambiguity of the seemingly innocent "own." Does this mean that our free contribution as human beings is not caused by God as first cause?! Then, when the text continues with its statement: they "do not deny that believers are fully involved personally in their faith," we have here one of the already above mentioned paradoxes.

68 *Sermo* 169, 11, 13: *PL* 38, 923. Editorial note: the translation which is cited comes from the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 2nd ed., (Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1997), p. 452, #1847. A literal translation reads as follows: "He made you without you, you are not justified without you." Cf. Ronald Shady, conversation, April 17, 2014. An alternative but looser translation is given by other sources: "He who created us without our help will not save us without our consent." Cf. <http://www.puritanboard.com/f35/quote-augustine-2566/> (accessed March 2, 2014).

69 Editorial note: please note that, in allegedly citing the German of Luther's text, as this allegedly exists in Luther's *Bondage of the Will*, Sala cites words which summarize the gist of Luther's teaching. The words which he cites, however, are not to be found in Luther's original text although, if we attend to the wording of Luther's text (using an English translation), we find words and sentences which point to the absoluteness of God's power (God's absolute sovereignty). Below, we cite pertinent words of text that are taken from Luther's *The Bondage of the Will*, as translated by James I. Packer and O. R. Johnston (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Fleming H. Revell, 1992), p. 101:

Now, the highest degree of faith is to believe that He is merciful, though He saves so few and damns so many; to believe that He is just, though of His own will He makes us perforce proper subjects for

To this end, the following remarks should be mentioned. First, as first cause, God brings about not only the being and the action of finite beings but also the manner of their operation: namely, either this action is necessary or it is free. In other words, God exists above and beyond the creaturely difference which exists between necessity and freedom, being the cause of both. This type of metaphysical principle applies both in the realm of nature and in the realm of grace. In numerous places, Thomas points to this transcendence of God; I refer, for instance, to his *Peri Hermeneias* [his *Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation*], bk. 1, lect. 14, especially para. 191-197. Hence, if this is so, then there can be no competitive relationship between God's sovereignty and man's freedom with respect to what is to be done for the sake of our salvation. Admittedly, yes, especially within the realm of our human freedom, more depends upon God than on the existence of a (*de facto* non-existent) pure natural order for the simple reason that, here, to a greater extent, we have the being and the acting of human beings. A decree of the Council of Trent had spoken about this truth in philosophical terms, employing words taken from St. Augustine who, with disarmingly simplicity and, at the same time, with depth, had noted as follows: with respect to the self-glorification of human beings because of their good works (against which Luther stormed), as St. Paul praises the Corinthians, in the same way, St. Augustine notes that the Lord's goodness towards all human beings "is so great that he wants his own gifts to be their merits." (DS 1548).

Secondly, with respect to the sovereignty of God who cannot deprive human beings of the freedom of their actions in any matter, it does not follow that, to God as first cause, the same "responsibility" belongs in terms of salvation as it is in terms of damnation. The reason is as follows: with respect to sin, sin as *formale peccati* [formal sin], i.e., as the lack of conformity which would exist between an act of will and the practical judgment of conscience, sin, precisely because of its utter irrationality and an absence of being, is the absence of being (since intelligibility and being are interchangeable) and so, as a consequence, sin is not to be attributed to God as first cause but to the human will as *causa deficiens* [as deficient cause]. However, where the action of a secondary cause is not found, a contingent event cannot be said to exist which would refer to the absolute being and action of God. The last point which we need to speak about, as we try to speak about the "genealogy" of sin, has to do with the culpability of the malfunctioning which occurs within our human wills.⁷⁰

That Luther presented his doctrine of justification under an imprint that was embossed with the formula *simul justus et peccator* [righteous and at the same time a sinner] is a consequence of what he had

condemnation, and seems (in Erasmus' words) to delight in the torments of poor wretches and to be a fitter object for hate than for love.'

⁷⁰ To touch on this issue here, I refer readers to my article, *Das Böse und Gott als Erstursache nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin* [Evil and God as First Cause according to St. Thomas Aquinas], which will be published in the *Zeitschrift Theologie und Philosophie* [the Journal of Theology and Philosophy], Volume 2001. On how we are to understand how God is and exists with respect to the existence of moral evil, Thomas writes as follows: *malum culpae, quod privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult* [moral evil, which upsets the ordering of things to divine good, God in no way wills] (*Summa Theologiae*, 1a, q. 19, a. 9). A succinct sentence follows in Aquinas's *ad tertium* response: *Deus vult mala fieri neque, neque non vult mala fieri: sed vult mala permittere. Et hoc est bonum* [God neither wills evils to be done nor wills evils not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is good].

taught about the powerlessness of human beings with respect to matters having to do with our salvation which do not change even with the bestowal of justification. With respect to these matters, Paul Althaus writes as follows: “This duality remains throughout the whole of one's life. With respect to myself, both always simultaneously apply. This is the high paradox of this Christian affirmation ... : the same is true of both the one and the same human being: being righteous and being a sinner and both are entirely true.”⁷¹ It is no wonder then that a theology which is knowingly committed to the teachings of Luther is prone to similar paradoxes, or that it is obliged to live with similar paradoxes. Not infrequently, Protestant authors try to overcome the impasses which exist for them within their theological tradition by engaging in deceptive evasions of one kind or another. In fact, they tend to reiterate these paradoxes in some other form.⁷² However, it is difficult to overlook a situation where references to paradoxes accompanied by rhetoric is not to be regarded as a serious form of argumentation.

With respect to such apparent solutions, any concept which refers to the mysteries of faith might also lead to the genesis of such solutions, giving them a degree of plausibility. To clarify this concept, the following should be noted. Divinely revealed mysteries, which exist with an excess of intelligibility that evades our understanding, can only be adequately grasped by an understanding which grasps an *intelligibile in sensibili* [an intelligible which exists within a sensible].⁷³ The analogical understanding which we have of these mysteries consists in grasping an intelligibility as this exists within the world together with the direction along which this intelligibility continues to go forward towards the infinite, coinciding with the intelligibility of another intelligibility that has already been grasped by us. However, in all this, we cannot see the infinitely distant point where the being of God exists in an absolutely simple way where these guidelines all meet. One such case, for example, refers to the aforementioned transcendence of God which we have discussed according to which, in God and descending from God, creaturely freedom and creaturely necessity coincide. However, such an excess of intelligibility should not to be confused with a negation of intelligibility in which a contradiction exists.

In the case of the question of justification, this means as follows (as a consequence). We cannot

⁷¹ Paul Althaus, *Die Theologie Martin Luthers* [The Theology of Martin Luther], Gütersloh 1962, 211. Editorial note: this book is available in an English edition.

⁷² It is also no wonder that even the *Joint Declaration* approaches the problem of justification from a Lutheran perspective in a manner which does not shy away from using similar paradoxes.

⁷³ Editorial note: please note that, technically speaking, no divine mystery can be adequately grasped by us as human beings, employing the kind of understanding which properly belongs to us as human beings. Hence, in this context, in translating what is meant by *adäquat*, this adjective can be also translated as „suitable“ or „appropriate.“ In addition, the context, at the same time, also suggests that, when we speak about an adequate understanding of divine mysteries, we should refer to a meaning for adequacy which is entirely relative. While our understanding of divine mysteries, in the context of our present life, is never adequate (it is not entirely satisfactory), this understanding can be relatively adequate if we refer to the kind of understanding which we can have if, in theology, we work with analogical acts of understanding and the limited kind of understanding which we can have through our analogical acts of understanding. A partial, limited understanding of divine things is always of immense value to us as human beings, indicating to us how we can better think about God and how we can better live our lives in ways that can respond to him in a better way, given what little we know about the kind of being that God is.

appreciate how statements which are mutually exclusive about the justification and non-justification of human beings do not make any difference in God himself. Herein lies the excess of intelligibility which exists with respect to absolute being. We certainly can see that it is contradictory to speak about a conformity between justification and reality which would exist as a conformity which would only come from the being of God's immutable reality.⁷⁴

The understanding of faith to which theologians are called in their search does not require of a theologian that he should waive his rationality "since the same God who reveals mysteries and infuses faith has bestowed the light of reason on the human mind, and God cannot deny himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth" (DS 3017). The Christian faith has no reason to fear reason; on the contrary, it has every reason to use reason to understand what God does to us when he forgives our sins and when he makes us his adopted sons. True love wants to become better acquainted with, if possible, that which she loves (or even better) the whom that she loves. Faith does not exist as an alternative to reason which is characterized by a dynamic that yearns for the transcendent; instead, reason presupposes faith in enabling reason to go beyond the range of that which it can do on the basis of its own initiative. The task of theology is to integrate the order of the supernatural, about which we know by faith, through an analogous understanding which God grants to him who inquires in an "diligent, pious, and sober manner" (DS 3016) and which fructifies our common, everyday life. For this purpose, fidelity to the demands of our intelligence and rationality is indispensable.

The Catholic theologian is well advised not to rely too readily on the market of current opinions as these exist in philosophy. His most challenging task demands rather that he develop, in constant dialogue with a given culture, a rational instrument that can actually be of use in helping other human beings of his day to grow in their understanding of the Christian faith. It is to be noted that the development of such instruments cannot occur without harm which would neglect "a philosophical heritage which is perennially valid"⁷⁵ that has been developed over the centuries through the work of pious reason. For *mens hominis est quasi lux illuminata a luce divini Verbi. Et ideo per lucem divini Verbi non evacuatur mens hominis, sed magis perficitur* [the mind of man is, as it were, a light lit up by

⁷⁴ Editorial note: please note that, according to Lonergan, God's causation and our human freedom (our free will) are intelligibly free of contradiction. They do not contradict each other. But, through an inverse insight (through an inverse act of understanding), we can grasp a degree or a kind of understanding. We do not try to look for an act of direct understanding which can grasp something which would exist as a positive intelligibility. Instead, we look for possible absences of contradiction. Lack of contradiction, if it is known, exists as a kind of knowledge and, in turn, absence of contradiction implies the possible existence of some kind of relation which could possibly exist between two terms or two extremes even if, admittedly, this link or connection has yet to be grasped by us in a manner which would point to the presence of a direct act of understanding. Cf. Lonergan, "On God and Secondary Causes," *Collection*, pp. 53-65; Ronald Shady, conversation, April 17, 2014.

⁷⁵ Second Vatican Council, *Decree on Priestly Formation*, 15. In the same way also, the encyclical *Fides et ratio* several times speaks about the value of a developed philosophical tradition as this has existed within the context of reflection about the meaning of the Christian faith: 60, 69, 106 etc. Editorial note: please note that, according to Lonergan, God's causation and our human freedom (our free will) are intelligibly free of contradiction. They do they contradict each other. But, through an inverse insight (an inverse act of understanding), we grasp some understanding. We do not try for an act of direct understanding which can grasp a positive intelligibility. Instead, we look for an absence of contradiction. Cf. Lonergan, "On God and Secondary Causes," *Collection*, pp. 53-65.

the light of the Divine Word; and hence by the presence of the Word, the mind of man is perfected rather than overshadowed] (*Summa Theologiae*, 3a, q. 5, a. 4, ad 2).